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From The Editor

In this issue our feature article discusses the evolution of--and justification for--the Air Force Academy's newest academic major: Military & Strategic Studies, an appropriate topic to launch the department's redesigned journal. Professor and Department Head, Colonel Tom Drohan, and co-author Associate Professor, Lt Colonel Steve Pomeroy, make their case for the evolution of MSS as crucial for the development of Air Force strategic thinkers. Following their lead, we move on to our topical focus of the month: Interagency Operations, featuring two articles authored by cadet scholars--including Hal Schmidt, top graduate of the class of 2011. Our regional focus this month is Africa, where cadet scholar authors discuss two leading concerns of AFRICOM: Chinese competition on the African continent, and the impact of the "Arab Spring" on Libya. Our cadet scholars published herein wrote for MSS 400S, Joint and Coalition Operations, demonstrating the result of departmental efforts to develop strategic thinkers.

Future issues of Airman Scholar Journal will continue to offer featured articles by faculty, and topical and regionally focused articles provided by faculty and cadets. Both military and civilian academic faculty and staff are encouraged to submit articles for publication and nominate outstanding cadet papers for inclusion in the journal. We also encourage faculty and cadets to write reviews of newly published books dealing with airpower, current conflicts, strategy and other military-relevant topics. Send all submissions in word format (with Chicago-style endnotes) to ASJeditor@usafa.edu

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WHO SPEAKS FOR OUR PROFESSION?

Military & Strategic Studies at the USAF Academy

THOMAS DROHAN AND STEVEN POMEROY

The Normandy invasion was based on a deep-seated faith in the power of the air forces, in overwhelming numbers, to intervene in the land battle...Without that air force, without the aid of its power, entirely aside from its ability to sweep the enemy air force out of the sky, without its ability to intervene in the land battle, that invasion would have been fantastic... Unless we had faith in the air power to intervene and to make safe that landing, it would have been more than fantastic, it would have been criminal.

General Dwight D. Eisenhower¹

War is our business. To do it well, our graduates must have a firm understanding of military power and its place within the American Republic. Since the 1954 founding of the United States Air Force Academy (USAF), the study of the context, theory, and application of military power has remained central to the institution's mission. Indeed, one may argue such expertise is the essence of a military academy education. Nonetheless, throughout the Academy's existence, arguments have raged over the disciplinary content and organizational ownership of this essence. Just as the founders, leaders, and scholars of the Academy sought to blend officer education and training, the earliest stirrings of the Department of Military and Strategic Studies tried to reconcile the theoretical aspects of military power with practical applications. Today, this Department is one of only a handful at North American undergraduate or graduate institutions offering an accredited disciplinary

major focused on understanding the theory and application of military power regardless of time and context. Given the importance of military power to American security, the broader scholarly enterprise warrants castigation for its neglect.

At the time of USAFA's founding, American national security girded upon then-President Dwight D. Eisenhower's policy of the New Look, meaning a near-exclusive reliance upon the deterrent value of air-delivered atomic weapons.

the peace, God willing, it will keep on doing so. This Academy, we are founding today, will carry forward that great effort."² Eisenhower concurred. In his 1955 dedication message, he foresaw the Air Force Academy, "taking its place beside West Point and Annapolis."³ He set USAFA's benchmark high, commenting, "the Air Force Academy joins a proud company. The honored histories of the two older institutions [West Point and Annapolis] provide a peerless standard against which, in future years,

...the Academy is a bridge to the future, gleaming with promise of peace in a stable, sane world...Our airpower has kept the peace... It is keeping the peace, God willing, it will keep on doing so.

- Harold Talbott, former Secretary of the Air Force

Because of this, understanding military power was of the highest national concern. As a West Point graduate, Eisenhower valued the necessity of educating professional military officers within a service-unique academy environment. A year later, Secretary of the Air Force Harold E. Talbott reflected this belief in his July 11, 1955, testimony before the House Subcommittee Hearings. Talbott commented, "the Air Force Academy is built upon a proud foundation and so it should be. For the Academy is a bridge to the future, gleaming with promise of peace in a stable, sane world...Our airpower has kept the peace...It is keeping

the excellence of the new Academy will be measured and found worthy."⁴ It was now up to the Academy's founders and first cadre to ensure they educated and trained cadets to meet the "peerless standard" of "the two older institutions."

Military Studies was one of the three areas specified by the Stearns-

Colonel Thomas Drohan is Professor and Department Head of Military & Strategic Studies. Lt Colonel Steven Pomeroy is an Associate Professor of Military & Strategic Studies, and the Departments's Deputy Head for Curriculum.

Eisenhower Board (1954) establishing a balanced curriculum in the new Air Force Academy. Despite the centrality military studies held in the minds of USAFA's founders, little consensus existed among faculty and staff regarding what the content ought to be and who ought to teach it. The Dean's faculty (DF) tended to adopt broad academic perspectives, while the Commandant's Cadet Wing (CW) cadre focused on practical training applications. As a result, Military Studies emerged in the sixties reflecting Cold War mind sets and tactical perspectives. The Commandant's daily priority was training cadets, which suppressed Military Studies as an evolving scholarly discipline. Regarding what Military Studies should be, the Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz commented "the first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish by that test the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature."⁵ The successful officer, therefore, had to distinguish carefully the dynamics of war's ever-changing character while relating to the enduring nature of war. Certain mid-twentieth century intellectuals, including the famed American historian, social critic, and commentator Lewis Mumford claimed, "the Army has usually been the refuge of third-rate minds."⁶ Clearly, the Academy preferred Clausewitz to Mumford, but neither DF nor CW could agree how to achieve this. Through the 1970s, military training priorities battered, buffeted, and strangled the academic credibility of Military Studies. Mumford was winning.

In the seventies, Military Studies organized within a new CW organization, the Deputy Commandant for Military Instruction (CWI), which included training. Later in 1980, a Per-

manent Professor of Military Instruction (then-Col Philip D. Caine, formally a senior member of the Academy's history department) was established.⁷ Caine's leadership was instrumental in creating a new academic discipline. He developed a faculty foundation drawn from related fields, including history, political science, and education. In addition,



Carl Von Clausewitz

courtesy of Clausewitz.com

Caine established a Ph.D. selection process to generate and sustain expert faculty. Assiduous personnel planning also ensured the best operational experience entered the ranks of CWI. During the 1980s, the first curriculum benefited from greater continuity in military leadership, Ph.D. oversight (including Dr. Jim Titus, whose 1983 arrival marked the first Ph.D. and the first officer awarded tenure as Associate Professor status in CW), and energetic talent in instructional technology (Dr. Dorri Karolick, an educational technologist). In later years, Caine's prescience reaped benefits.

The benefits were yet to come, however. Meanwhile, tensions between the Academy's educational and training missions inhibited Military Studies ("Mil Stu" in cadet parlance). According to General Caine, Military Studies was at this time: "a branch of the Military

Training Division, which was a major problem. It left the Military Studies curriculum and personnel with the stigma of change, mediocre instruction, and fluid curriculum attached to Military Training programs. This was a major obstacle to gaining any kind of solid academic credibility for the Professional Military Studies [PMS, a fortunately short-lived moniker] program."⁸ Thus, Caine's first action upon becoming CWI was to split the organization into two divisions: the Military Studies Division (CWIS) and the Military Training Division (CWIT).

For the first time since 1961, a dedicated academic organization charged with developing academically sound and credible military education existed at USAFA.⁹

As Caine noted, Military Studies and its successors delivered a fluidly haphazard collection of courses whose content was determined by available faculty interests and expertise (perhaps abetted by a not-so-strategic Air Force assignment process) rather than by a coherent disciplinary major. CWI offered courses on a variety of strategic, doctrinal and operational topics but had not framed them to serve as a purposeful, integrated cadet program of study. For instance, CWI offered a course on "global strike" due mainly to the presence of a bomber pilot faculty member, but there was no treatment of other Air Force competencies or richer theoretical approaches to strategy and warfare. In response to Chief of Staff of the Air Force interest, an interdisciplinary minor, then major, prosaically (committee-created) entitled MDOS (Military Doctrine, Operations, and Strategy) was established in the 1990's.¹⁰ Given that an academic discipline results in a system of orderly behavior recognized as being characteristic of that discipline, the multidisciplinary "MDOS" did not fit the mold.¹¹ In fact, there was only one required MDOS course in the major,

reflecting a lack of depth in doctrine, operations and strategy. In 2000, Military Strategic Studies (MSS) replaced MDOS to provide cadets with a “scholarly approach to understanding and investigating new knowledge, ways of working, and perspectives on the world around them.”¹² Since its establishment, MSS has purposefully developed the context, theory and application of mili-

dent of the Naval Academy, to study the Academy’s social environment and recommend changes. Larson’s findings emphasized the Academy must remain “relevant to the larger Air Force” and focused “on the deliberate development of Air Force officers... The Academy ... must reflect the values and norms of the broader Air Force while maintaining the high academic standards of a world-class

ponent. Seeking to increase the professional relevance of cadet academics, his report’s ninth finding noted:

At the Air Force Academy, the Commandant is responsible for cadet training as well as an entire academic department and major-Military Strategic Studies (MSS)...This is in contrast to the other two service academies and promotes a separation of the education mission and blurs the distinction between education and training...In fact, we believe it creates the perception that the Dean’s faculty are neither good military role models nor informed and capable enough to oversee and teach the courses in the MSS major.¹⁷

Since its establishment, MSS has purposefully developed the context, theory and application of military power as the professionally relevant and academically rigorous framework of a new academic discipline.

tary power as the professionally relevant and academically rigorous framework of a new academic discipline.

A study of other degree-awarding programs in military-related fields of study at universities across North America, Europe, Asia, and Australia highlighted the need for a contemporary-oriented military and strategic studies discipline.¹³ As such, there occurred a systematic program of course development in strategy providing context and theory and operations (application). Strategy courses included Developing the Military Strategist, Theory of Military Transformation, Theory of Air, Space, and Information Power, Civil-Military Relations, and Counterinsurgency Theory and Practice. Operations courses spanned Air Warfare, Space Operations and the Warfighter, Information Operations, and Special Operations. These efforts soon bore fruit. As the Academy experienced several years of increased Congressional scrutiny due to pressing gender and religious issues, outside investigations brought recommendations for changes that not only addressed social concerns but also military training and academics.

In 2005, Congress selected Admiral Charles Larson, former Superinten-

dent of the Naval Academy, to study the Academy’s social environment and recommend changes. Larson saw an “organizational drift and academic split” because USAFA was the only service academy with an academic department under the Commandant.¹⁵

The admiral advocated separating the education and training functions as the best way to ensure in-depth and comprehensive excellence. In his mind, placing an education function within CW, an organization focused on training, diluted scholarship and faculty expertise, thereby inhibiting cadet intellectual potential. The growth of Military Strategic Studies within the Commandant’s realm therefore struck him as an “approach [that] fragments rather than integrates cadet development,” a point General Caine made years earlier.¹⁶ To fix this, he recommended transferring MSS from the Cadet Wing to the Dean of Faculty. This led to the inactivation of the 34th Education Group and the establishment of the Department of Military Strategic Studies (DFMI). His recommendation replicated how a joint force integrates expertise to create operational synergies. Within the joint construct, each air, ground, and maritime component delivers unique excellence, and to Larson, this meant academics logically fit within the Academy’s academic com-

Larson believed MSS as a professionally relevant academic department would flourish within the Dean of Faculty and improve the effectiveness and efficiency of cross-integrated and internally consistent mission elements with each focused on its distinctive capabilities.

Military Strategic Studies also featured prominently in Larson’s second finding, which described the need for separate mission element capabilities aligned through a common Academy mission and vision. He stated:

The Academy Mission Elements are Not Well Integrated—Historically, there has been competition rather than cooperation between the Academy’s three mission elements or “pillars”—academic, athletic, and military training. Although the Air Force Academy has its own mission statement, each element, in turn, has developed separate visions and mission statements that reinforce rather than integrate their distinctive contributions to the overall mission. This stovepiped approach fragments rather than integrates cadet development.¹⁸

To prevent further fragmentation, DF’s newest academic department had to become fully emplaced within the Academy’s disciplinary majors. Larson’s recommendations, including aligning the Department of Military and Strategic Studies within the Dean of Faculty and securing its equality with its peers in the basic sciences, engineering, humanities, and social sciences, therefore helped

answer Eisenhower's dedication benchmark to educate Air Force officers to a "peerless standard."

A comparative look at MSS begins best by noting differences relative to its academy antecedents. At USMA, the Commandant's Department of Military

applies concepts in contemporary and future decision-making scenarios. As in the social sciences, MSS uses methods to evaluate operational concepts and strategic frameworks. As in the humanities, MSS addresses the human struggle of warfare. Literally, MSS is

humanities and social sciences disciplines, including history, economics, public policy, strategy, and education, among others. An active faculty development program includes professional development seminars each semester, monthly theorist seminars, auditing requirements, classroom visitations, a faculty resource center, and lesson-by-lesson assessment of learning and associated data collection and analysis.

The summation of the efforts by the Department of Military & Strategic Studies provides for the young strategist's education. Consistent with Betts's model, the discipline contends there must be a balance of the formal reasoning of the social sciences and the informal reasoning of the humanities, which is one reason why MSS faculty draws equally from each. Although some would argue this creates a dichotomy, the reality is different. Returning to the time of USAFA's founding, the "American Clausewitz," Bernard Brodie ruminated:

Economists ...have a theoretical training that in its fundamentals bears many striking parallels to strategic concepts... The usual training in economics has its own characteristic limitations, among which is the tendency to make its possessor insensitive to and often intolerant of political considerations that get in the way of his theory of calculations. He is normally extremely weak in either diplomatic or military history or even in contemporary politics, and is rarely aware of how important a deficiency this is for strategic insight...The devotees of a science like economics, which is clearly the most impressive of the social sciences in terms of theoretical structure, tend to develop a certain disdain and even arrogance concerning other social science fields, which seem to them primitive in their techniques and intellectually unworthy.¹⁹

Brodie, a social scientist who clamored for scientific rigor in national security strategy, realized the important utility of disciplines whose methods lacked a formal theoretical and predictive structure. For MSS, the humanities matter for the perspective they provide

The successful strategist therefore requires knowledge residing in both the social sciences and the humanities. Teaching the context, theory, and application of military power demands, as Larson and Caine understood, that this admixture occurs in the context of a discipline focused upon strategy.

Instruction teaches Military Science but not Military and Strategic Studies. As General Caine commented, the Air Force Academy tried this approach at USAFA for fifty years, during which it attempted to pursue academic excellence in a CW organization characterized by a high operations tempo and an unstable faculty corps due to the military assignment process. Meanwhile, to improve its education, USMA has established an interdisciplinary Military Defense and Strategic Studies major that resembles USAFA's earlier interdisciplinary MDOS, with courses provided by multiple departments. At the United States Naval Academy, an academic dean oversees a Department of Professional Development (Professional Programs, Seamanship & Navigation, Waterfront Readiness). There is no military/nautical studies discipline or major, or sight of it on Annapolis's horizon. During an era in which the United States demands more high quality strategic thinkers steeped in the context, theory, and application of military power, USAFA has earned lessons to which its peers should pay heed.

Within USAFA, MSS starts where political science ends with respect to military strategy, uses historical and other approaches to evaluate theory, and

the "military" portion of "strategic studies." In this, the discipline adopted scholar-strategist Richard Betts's distinctions among military studies, strategic studies, and security studies to propose "MSS" as an appropriate description for military studies at USAFA. As a military profession-focused academic discipline, MSS differs in content and methods from other departmental offerings, yet shares some sources. In this, MSS is as complementary to other disciplines as Clausewitz's Trinity is to Sun Zi's maxims.

Reflecting its interdisciplinary heritage, MSS faculty possesses diverse operational experiences and academic backgrounds, which fuels innovation and responsiveness to contemporary and notional future strategic needs. The Department's active duty faculty blends rated officers from multiple flying communities with space operators, nuclear operators, intelligence, and multiple mission support career fields. Exchange officers from the U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, Royal Air Force, and Japan Air Self-Defense Force add joint and coalition perspectives on combined operations. The Department's first sponsored PhD's began to return in 2006, establishing a cycle of developing MSS associate professors. Doctoral degrees comprise

in educating strategists. Brodie decried the lack of this in his day's strategists, lamenting:

Thus, where the great strategic writers and teachers of the past...based the development of their art almost entirely on a broad and perceptive reading of history, in the case of Clausewitz and Jomini mostly recent history but exceptionally rich for their needs, the present generation of "civilian strategists" are with markedly few exceptions singularly devoid of history.²⁰

The successful strategist therefore requires knowledge residing in both the social sciences and the humanities. Teaching the context, theory, and application of military power demands, as Larson and Caine understood, that this admixture occurs in the context of a discipline focused upon strategy.

As educators, these are not easy tasks. The discipline of Military and Strategic Studies as practiced at the United States Air Force Academy blends the approaches of the social sciences and humanities to sustain a new discipline central to a military academy's value-added mission. Failure to do so would result in an incomplete education. This generates creative scholarly and administrative tensions, but if the strategist is to be educated properly, the tensions are necessary. Lack of scientific rigor or the perspectives needed to understand the human mind precede strategic failure. It is not enough to equip the minds of Academy-graduated strategists with specialization in solely the social sciences or humanities. They need both. In part, the core curriculum serves to provide this; however, individual courses in behavioral science, history, political science, and the like cannot refract their disciplines through the prisms of strategy and military theory as well as a discipline designed for that purpose. Although courses such as these may touch upon the strategy and the context, theory, and application of military power to explain their unique concepts, they cannot provide the education in

how to synthesize these varied thoughts and apply them to contemporary and notional future strategic problems. This is the business of those teaching Military and Strategic Studies.²¹

As such, the pedagogy of MSS requires applying to our military profession Plutarch's ancient advice: *the mind is not a vessel to be filled but a fire to be kindled*. To serve the nation best, the mind's passions must continuously develop, for study and reflection upon these permit decisions and actions for the better. Thus, in answering the popular conventional wisdom questioning the state-of-thought within American military and strategic studies, we in the arena of such an enterprise must speak for our profession. If our actions are to speak louder than our words, our protégés need to have done their thinking well, too. This is the essence of harmonizing the "strategic lieutenant" with the increasing intellectual demands

*The mind is not a vessel
to be filled but a fire to be
kindled.*

- Plutarch

of competitive military thinking, a major desired outcome of Military and Strategic Studies.

To this, the Department of Military and Strategic Studies provides a humanistic and scientifically rigorous approach focused on military and strategic studies expertise to prepare well the young officer strategist for service to the nation. But there is something of deeper import here. The strength of a free people comes from their education. For it is through education the people learn to ask courageous questions and to answer them with credible depth of knowledge. As productive members of the American Republic, it is up to all citizens to do this, because in such a republic, we all speak with equal import,

thereby rendering the judgment "war is too important to be left to the generals" as ridiculous as saying "war is too important to be left to the politicians." War, perhaps the most human of all activities, is the thinking business of all departments at the Air Force Academy, a responsibility for which the Department of Military and Strategic Studies contributes its unique voice as we prepare cadets for the most consequential profession of all, the profession of arms.

NOTES

¹ Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, 1948), 261.

² Testimony of Harold E. Talbott, Secretary of the Air Force, U.S., Congress, House of Representatives, Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, 84th Congress, 1st Session, 1955, 224.

³ President Dwight D. Eisenhower, July 11, 1955, Dedication Message.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 88.

⁶ Lewis Mumford, *Technics and Civilization* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, Inc., 1934), 95. Mumford certainly was critical of the military, but he was also one of the few American intellectuals who supported an early American entry into World War Two.

⁷ Caine retired as a Brigadier General and his hereafter referred to by his retired rank.

⁸ Brigadier General Philip D. Caine, CWI 1980 - 1992 End of Tour Report, 13-14. General Caine's tenure at USAFA saw many significant changes and evolutions. His perspective on the development of Military Studies into the Department of Military and Strategic Studies is peerless. Professional Military Studies later became "Military Art and Science," an appellation blindly adopted from the United States Military Academy and Army Reserve Officer Training Corps.

⁹ During the Academy's formative period, Military Studies transferred to the Dean of the Faculty for a year, a Directorate of Military Affairs was established, and an academic major planned. By 1960, a new Commandant's priorities prompted its return, so CW reacquired the responsibility. See Paul T. Ringenbach, *Battling Tradition: Robert F. McDermott and Shaping the U.S. Air Force Academy* (Chicago: Imprint Publications, 2006), 169.

¹⁰ CWIS and MDOS continued evolving as part of the 34th Education Group (EDG). Until reorganization under the Objective Wing Concept in 1994, the 34 EDG organized as a Division of Military Instruction that included training under CWIT. This organization designed and taught all military education courses, managed the Commandant's educational enhancement programs, and generally taught School of Advanced Air and Spacepower Studies concepts at the undergraduate level. Organized into two squadrons, a profound conceptual leap occurred in January 2001. The mission became "producing aerospace officers schooled in the application of military and aerospace power," a clearly innovative step towards the current Department of Military and Strategic Studies mission of "developing Air Force officers educated in the context, theory, and application of military power. See Colonel Thomas A. Drohan, "EDG Options Historical Brief," Department of Military and Strategic Studies, Historical Records.

¹¹ Marietta Del Favero, "What is an Academic Discipline," available at www.answers.com/topic/academic-disciplines, accessed 1 July 2008.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ A short list of example programs includes: 1) in North America, Johns Hopkins University's School for Advanced International Studies, the University of Calgary's Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, Missouri State University's Defense and Strategic Studies, National Defense University's Institute for National Strategic Studies, and the Royal Military College of Canada's Military and Strategic Studies program; 2) in Europe, King's College's War Studies Program and London's International Institute for Strategic Studies; 3) in Asia, the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies in Singapore, the Regional Centre for Strategic Studies in Sri Lanka, the Institute of Strategic

and International Studies in Malaysia, and India's Centre for Asian Strategic Studies; 4) in Australia, the Australian National University's Strategic and Defence Studies Centre.

¹⁴ Quotes in this paragraph from Agenda for Change, <http://www.usafa.edu/index.cfm?catname=Scouting>. Accessed March 18, 2010. Both the Agenda for Change and the Larson Report emerged at a complex time in the Academy's history. Under intense public and Congressional observation resulting from several highly publicized sexual assaults, the Agenda for Change and Larson Report expanded in scope to examine and report on multiple areas of cadet experience, of which academics were only one.

¹⁵ Department of the Air Force, "A Study and Report Related to Permanent Professors at the United States Air Force Academy," (April 2004), 3-8. This study, commissioned by the Secretary of the Air Force is known informally as the Larson Report, and is hereafter cited as such. Chapter and page are the basis of the document's pagination. Thus, 3-8 equates to chapter three, page eight.

¹⁶ Ibid., 5-1. Admiral Larson contended that concentrating like functions within the appropriate mission element delivered a given element's best product. Thus, by including all majors within DF, he attempted to ensure the best possible education. Concentrating training within CW provided focus on officer training. .

¹⁷ Ibid., 5-3.

¹⁸ Ibid., 5-1. See also Finding Nine, page 5-3, Recommendation Two, page 6-1, and Recommendation Twelve, page 6-3.

¹⁹ Bernard Brodie, *War and Politics* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1973), 474 – 475.

²⁰ Ibid., 475.

²¹ The reality of human thought is that ideas know no boundaries, meaning a history course, for example, may well require a discussion of strategy to understand a topic. Conversely, a military and strategic studies course may examine the past of human thought, i.e. history, to test the relevance and validity of an idea.



THE AIR FORCE ACADEMY CHAPEL

CONSTRUCTING A WAY TO VICTORY:

The US Interagency Conflict over Reconstruction and Development Operations during Wartime

KIMBER SHEALY

In Herat, Afghanistan, during the late months of 2006, a group of military and civilian workers presented over 12,000 fruit trees to districts in Herat to help the economy and provide an alternative to the illegal opium field farming. The medley of government, military and aid workers operating together under a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) facilitated this donation through the United Nations' Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups. The Afghani local government officials had worked with the PRT and the UN to complete this donation, allowing the Afghani leaders not only to benefit from the economic and agricultural development, but also from playing a direct role with the PRTs to improve their province.¹ Since 2002, PRTs have played a vital role in Iraq and Afghanistan as they perform counterinsurgency (COIN) through development and stability operations, such as working with local councils, providing veterinary and other agriculture and livestock services, building schools and essential infrastructure, and post-war reconstruction. With over fifty active teams, the military has taken on an unprecedentedly large role in stability and reconstruction efforts in these two countries in what many deem a civilian responsibility.² However, with the funding, manpower, mass organizational capabilities and ability to send forces into dangerous areas, the military seems most capable at this time to carry out these operations.³

During a time of war and heavy COIN operations, the military should be heavily involved in reconstruction and stability operations. Civilian organizations that specialize in these areas, though, should play a significant role, receive more funding, and take on an increased share of responsibility in development and stability work in Afghanistan, Iraq and other fragile and failed states.

During the 1990s, the United States dealt with many conflicts throughout the world, such as in Eastern Europe, Somalia, and Haiti. The US government relied heavily on the United States

different organizations, like the State Department (DoS), the US Agency for International Development (USAID), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), international financial institutions and the US military competed for different foreign development tasks. This competition created an incredibly inefficient and overlapping system with little structure or cooperation.⁵ Since these operations had become more prevalent in US security initiatives, President Bill Clinton attempted to resolve some of the issues through his Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 56, The Clinton

With the ability to react swiftly to natural disasters and the organization and manpower to handle large aid operations, the military is the most capable organization for development, aid and reconstruction missions, to the chagrin of the military's civilian development counterparts.

Armed Forces for nation building or reconstruction.⁴ With the ability to react swiftly to natural disasters and the organization and manpower to handle large aid operations, the military is the most capable organization for development, aid and reconstruction missions, to the chagrin of the military's civilian development counterparts. As the role of stability operations grew in importance, not only as a post-conflict but preventative action in fragile states, many advocated for greater civilian involvement and responsibility. During this time many

Administration's Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations, in an attempt to create a better system for interagency cooperation, planning and management. Although this PDD proved ineffective in accomplishing most of its objectives, it did contribute to the "unity of effort" problem by bringing

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some of the aforementioned-involved organizations into closer synchronization with each other.⁶ The improved, yet still weak and fragmented management of nation-building operations would soon become even more important with the outbreak of war in Iraq and Afghanistan; however, the weakness of these operations as well as the competition among agencies would be exacerbated.

After 9/11 and the initial conventional war phase and “victory” in Iraq, the military commander and DoS saw the need to rebuild the war-torn urban centers and assist new governments as a way of ensuring that the US left the countries in a condition of relative stability with the potential to prosper. The Senate did not want the traditional, military-led development operations to run this mission in the usual fashion of “cobbled together plans, people and resources in an ad hoc fashion, usually with the Defense Department in the lead.”⁷ The Bush Administration desired civilian workers to rebuild Iraq’s political system, schools, and buildings in a way that would bring the country prosperity while still keeping its cultural identity.⁸

In 2005, President Bush created the National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44, titled Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations to create the Office for the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stability (S/CRS) and shift responsibility of the management of stability and reconstruction efforts to the State Department.⁹ The Department of Defense agreed with this transfer and commented, “Military action alone cannot bring long-term peace and prosperity; therefore, we need to include all elements of national and institutional power.”¹⁰ By providing the mechanism by which these organizations can function and cooperate together, the shared operations will not only relieve stress placed on the military, but also provide a more effective system

for reconstruction and stability in Iraq and Afghanistan.¹¹

Despite a lack of funds and manpower, the S/CRS quickly took off after its creation in 2005. Different from USAID, this new office focused on short-term aid during the beginning transition of failed or fragile countries and the foundation for further development.¹² Active in about thirty countries, but mostly in Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan and Sudan, S/CRS recruits not only DoS employees but an array of agricultural, medical, political and financial specialists to find the best solutions providing improved stability. Needing a diverse group of specialists to choose from when the situation demands led the S/CRS to create the Civilian Response Corps, which takes volunteers from nine US government agencies, all with varying experiences and specialties. Not only does S/CRS pull from these different

As the pendulum swung towards a primarily civilian force in 2005, criticisms of NSPD 44 brought policymakers back to the table. Although civilian workers do play a crucial role in these operations, many DoS and DoD employees believed that the military plays an integral part as well. By having the aforementioned structure and security provided by the military, civilian forces can begin reconstruction and stability operations much sooner after or even during a conflict to prevent further deterioration and to set a good foundation for long-term nation-building.¹⁵ In 2005, the DoD Directive 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSR) Operations, helped resolve this issue by recognizing that American civilian specialists or foreign professionals will be most effective in completing these operations, while the military will be

To win the hearts and minds of the Afghani and Iraqi people the US must focus on three categories of effort: governance, development and security.

agencies, it also has an active or reserve employee pool, based upon the military’s system of reserve forces who can be called up when needed.¹³

Although the Office for the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stability emphasizes the necessity of civilian employees in these particular missions, it does not discredit the requirement of military forces. In more tumultuous countries, such as Afghanistan, the civilian workers not only need the military for security, but also, the military has provided a system under which the civilians work. This cooperation and “whole-of-government” approach, even if brittle at times, is necessary in most effectively providing reconstruction, stability and development in the most desperate regions.¹⁴

needed in a supporting role to maintain order and provide security when its partners cannot.¹⁶ This relationship between the military and civilians would allow the military personnel to focus on their more traditional operations, while still providing the needed support and reaping the benefits of civilian nation-building and reconstruction.¹⁷ Although Directive 3000.05 set clear directions and had good intentions, the implementation proved difficult due to the slow formations of integral parts and funding for the civilian forces.¹⁸

Many of these initiatives and directives dealt primarily with unifying organizations throughout the US government to address global instability and its threat to US national security. The military supports these initiatives, but adds another reason for reconstruc-

tion and stability efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan: counterinsurgency. In the military's battle against terrorism, counterinsurgency doctrine has quickly become a priority as the enemy, especially in Afghanistan, continues to fight an insurgent war. These untraditional wars have posed a conundrum to the US military and policymakers as they try to formulate the most effective way

governments and councils, education, agriculture and other means of employment. As the US actually provides means for stability in Afghanistan, the people will discard their support for insurgents, allowing victory for the US. Coincidentally, the Taliban has taken on similar strategies recorded in the Code of Conduct for the Mujahidin of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. This

ment provided a strong diplomatic and nation-building expertise. Currently, the civilian component can consist of DoS, USAID, a variety of other US government organizations, NGOs, specialists depending on the area or the need, and indigenous workers.²⁴ The PRTs do not intend to work long-term in Iraq and Afghanistan but aim to provide an immediate response to the destruction and desolation in order to promote stability and prosperity. Kilcullen describes the military's role in development in one of his twenty-eight articles of counterinsurgency: "Most importantly, know that your operations will create temporary breathing space, but long-term development and stabilization by civilian agencies will eventually win the war."²⁵

Differing in size from fifty to three hundred people, the PRTs consist of military support personnel, such as communications, protection, intelligence, or logistics, political advisors, development experts and a variety of other more specific specialists, such as agriculturalists, engineers, or financial advisors. Members that understand the culture and language are one of the most important requirements in these groups, so that the team can successfully help the people in a particular area. In all of the teams' activities, the groups ensure that they have the approval of local leaders and the central government for both coordination and diplomatic considerations.²⁶ As the PRTs grew in popularity, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) took control of a portion of the PRTs along with the United States.²⁷ International organizations set clearer guidelines for PRTs and improved the relationship between civilian and military forces within the groups. Some of these guidelines gave more of an identity and motivation to PRTs, such as the missions to build provincial capacity, foster economic development, strengthen the rule of law and promote reconciliation. Within the first few years, the results

First deployed in Afghanistan, the Provincial Reconstruction Teams were formed to coordinate both military and civilian power and capabilities for reconstruction tasks and political and security advisement.

to achieve victory. Australian Lieutenant Colonel David Kilcullen describes counterinsurgency as "a competition with the insurgent for the right and the ability to win the hearts, minds and acquiescence of the population."¹⁹ To win the hearts and minds of the Afghani and Iraqi people the US must focus on three categories of effort: governance, development and security. From there the US military can effectively aid the foreign governments and try to provide a stable and potentially prosperous society. Whether a prosperous society comes through construction, education, security, agriculture, or government, the people will respond and side with the group that can most capably meet their needs.²⁰

Focusing on Afghanistan, the most basic way to win the Afghani people over lies with first meeting their most basic needs, such as food, shelter, water and means of making a living. Not only will this provide a more stable country and possibly prevent it from falling into future conflicts, but meeting these needs will begin to persuade the Afghani people and government away from the insurgents. After basic needs are met, the US can then try to meet the needs of the society as whole. This refers to local

code of conduct instructs members to adhere to Islamic principles and work to "win the hearts of Muslims at large."²¹ The competition over who can better persuade the Afghani people continues, but the United States holds a resource that the Taliban does not have access to quite as easily: money. In General Petraeus' speech to counterinsurgency commanders in 2003, Petraeus' claimed, "Money can be ammunition."²²

From the US military's Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cells that had been in place in 2001, a new unit formed that would attempt to bring together the efforts of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and other NGOs. Officially formed in late 2002, the military dubbed these units as Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), which would potentially create mechanisms to aid their counterinsurgency efforts and to create support for the new central government. First deployed in Afghanistan, the PRTs were formed to coordinate both military and civilian power and capabilities for reconstruction tasks and political and security advisement.²³ The military portion of these teams allowed the groups to venture into more unstable and hazardous areas, while the civilian compo-

and benefits of these teams led other countries to follow the US-lead. By 2005, Britain, Germany, the Dutch, New Zealand and other coalition countries created their own PRTs to use throughout Afghanistan.²⁸ Since then, even more countries have joined this effort, and together have created a robust and diverse reconstruction and stabilization effort.

In Afghanistan, many tribal leaders are especially enthusiastic about the United States' effort to help rebuild their

in different areas. For example, the US and Iraqi leadership have prioritized the need for reconstruction of war torn cities and villages as well as political advisement. All with the intent of creating a more prosperous and stable society to prevent autocratic rule or the growth of terrorism, the US has achieved some great victories in helping the Iraqi people. To combat both the problems of unemployment and the need for reconstruction, the US government created almost 70,000 jobs, many

civilian organizations are needed, and PRTs are the medium for this cooperation to occur. Former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice commented on the effectiveness of the combined military-civilian force in 2007: "The logic behind PRTs is simple. Success in Iraq relies on more than military efforts; it requires robust political and economic progress. Our military operations must be fully supported and integrated with our civilian and diplomatic efforts across the entire US government to help Iraqis clear, hold, and build throughout all of Iraq."³⁴ The division of labor will provide the advantage of different points of view in projects due to the diverse vocations and experience levels of the members of a PRT. Early civilian involvement in stabilization efforts will also provide a better foundation for long lasting development after the US military leaves Iraq and Afghanistan.

Although many praise the Provincial Reconstruction Teams, they also receive large amounts of criticism. From calling them "successful but not sufficient" to harmful and a mere public affairs' stunt, the consistent criticism has forced leaders of the groups to reevaluate their tactics and operations.³⁵ Critics first analyzed the lack of a strategic plan and the reactionary attitude of the PRTs. Without a clear objective or plan, military and civilian leaders have no way of correctly evaluating the teams' performances as successful or unsuccessful. In Afghanistan, lacking an objective has led to inconsistent goals and accomplishments for PRTs. This occurs, for example, when one group believes the most important aspect of its mission is to provide security and prevent attacks within that city, paying little attention to the people, where another group believes that security remains important but secondary to creating relationships with the village leaders and people and attempting to meet their needs.³⁶ Not only do inconsistencies dwell in the

Within the first few years of action, the PRTs have proven themselves successful in multiple ways. First, they provide stability to regions through reconstruction and other aid efforts... Secondly, and equally important, the teams are helping resolve the interagency conflict with respect to development and stability projects.

villages. For example, in 2005, a PRT team met with the village elders a few hours south of Kabul to discuss what the elders believed their village needed. The inclusion of the Afghani government not only allowed the American PRT to better understand what the village desired, but also allowed the elders to feel involved with the reconstruction, which built a sense of pride and allegiance with the Americans. At the end of the meeting, PRT members added that the Afghans were in charge of the reconstruction and the US remained solely to facilitate the process. After the meeting, the two groups agreed to build actual school buildings so that the province will prosper in the future.²⁹ With this development, children would soon be able to attend school again. Other specific projects include repair of infrastructure, irrigation and pipeline construction, medical assistance and agricultural techniques and assistance.³⁰

In Iraq, the mission remains much the same but with a greater emphasis

involving reconstruction and clean up of war debris.³¹ The PRTs also have focused on teaching government employees in Iraq basic business skills and civics to decrease the gap between the minority of highly educated individuals and the rest of the government workers. One of the most impressive and effective aspects of these groups in Iraq is that they do not just give free aid, but mentor Iraqis on setting up budgets to fund their country's own reconstruction.³²

Within the first few years of action, the PRTs have proven themselves successful in multiple ways. First, they provide stability to regions through reconstruction and other aid efforts. These major efforts not only create a more stable country, but allow the people to grow closer to the US, as they see it as best meeting their needs. Secondly, and equally important, the teams are helping resolve the interagency conflict with respect to development and stability projects. In the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, both the military and

American PRTs, but the combination of German, UK and a variety of other coalition PRTs in Afghanistan create even greater ambiguities over what PRTs should be accomplishing and how.³⁷

Along with no clear mission, the coalition PRTs have no unified commander under which they reside. A leader that would oversee these operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq could provide a better and more informed chain-of-command that could address stability and reconstruction doctrinal issues, give the PRTs a cohesive mission, and help with the inconsistencies in operations.

The commander could work with the leaders of similar organizations to ensure that miscommunication is kept to a minimum and that the different development and aid organizations work together in the most advantageous ways for both the coalition and the countries of interest. Also, with a unified PRT

command, the various countries' teams could better coordinate efforts together and disperse ideas with greater ease.³⁸

With a vague mission and no strategic oversight, some PRTs believed that achieving success could be found in building the most buildings or providing the greatest number of services in the shortest amount of time, with little regard to the opinions of the indigenous people. The PRTs not only did this to impress their superiors, but also to quickly impress the local people of Afghanistan and Iraq and prove that the coalition forces came with good intentions. Robert Perito of the US Institute

of Peace commented on the issue saying, "Pressure from senior military authorities to demonstrate progress...resulted in the hasty construction of building without reference to the Afghan government's capacity to support these activities. Schools were built without teachers and clinics without doctors."³⁹ Also, the desire to quickly achieve success had led to some substandard construction of buildings or inadequate understanding of certain projects, such as piping and water distribution. These haphazard projects may achieve temporary success and excite the people of the village; but

act as the main diplomatic representatives on the teams.⁴¹ The Office for the Coordinator of Stability and Reconstruction and its Civilian Response Corps should become more involved with this issue, as its Civilian Response Corps vastly consists of retired diplomats, area and skill experts, linguists, and military members.⁴² Also, the military has also recognized its deficiencies in cultural and language experts, and reemphasized the importance of training more personnel in these specialties. The US Air Force, for example, has more than doubled the amount of its Foreign Area Specialists and Political-Military Specialists.⁴³

Finally, and one of the greatest disparagements of Provincial Reconstruction Teams, people have criticized the mere presence of military members in development, aid and reconstruction activities. The criticism comes mostly from the NGOs that have resided in a region for some time and feel that the military's presence "[blurs] the line between military and humanitarian assistance."⁴⁴ This criticism was especially relevant at the beginning of both Operation Enduring



PRT SUPPORTING FARAH PROVINCE IN AFGHANISTAN

in the end, they harm the indigenous people more than they help as a portion of the buildings and projects fail.

Part of the reason for the aforementioned ineffectiveness or poor quality of reconstruction and stability effort lies with the lack of language, ethnic, political and religious expertise within the PRTs.⁴⁰ This issue has led to many mistakes and taboo behavior within Afghanistan and Iraq that have hindered the American PRTs to make swift strides towards stabilization. For example, the State Department has not prioritized the people it sends to the PRTs leaving many junior Foreign Service Officers to

Freedom and Iraqi Freedom as traditional military operations continued throughout the countries, while at the same time, largely military PRTs attempted to provide aid and assistance while in uniform. The NGOs believed that the PRTs presence and their similar missions endangered the non-military relief workers, since the indigenous people, including some insurgents, might identify the NGO staff with the US military. As the threat of attack increased, especially of less protected people, insurgents began targeting relief workers. After one of its personnel was killed, the renowned Doctors without

Borders left Afghanistan and blamed the PRTs for the increase of attacks on relief workers. In this same sense, civilian workers for development and stability believed that the military uniforms among them on the PRTs compromised the relief workers' mission by making their efforts seem part of a military strategy.⁴⁵

The criticism continues, but during a time of war, as the United States finds itself in currently, the military will continue to play a heavy role in reconstruction. However, this does not mean that civilian workers should not be heavily involved as well. In 1967, the military created a similar group to the Provincial Reconstruction Team called the Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS). This group united both civilian and military personnel to provide security for the people, persuade the people of the superiority of South Vietnam and target the insurgents' infrastructure.⁴⁶ Before they came together, the different groups, including the military, were ineffective in providing humanitarian aid and means of development on their own. PRT commanders should examine many of this program's characteristics, as the lessons learned therefrom may make the current teams more effective and provide understanding to the civilian personnel within PRTs. For example, CORDS had an agreed upon and clear objective, which allowed greater "unity of effort" among the different organizations and groups. Writing on the strategy used, Dale Andrade claims, "Key to the entire strategy is the integration of all efforts towards a single goal."⁴⁷ Moreover, the US military funded the Vietnam war-time reconstruction and development groups, placing them within the military chain of command, yet the groups consisted of primarily civilian workers.⁴⁸ The Department of Defense recognized the benefits of this program and CORDS received over 7,600 advisors by 1969,

and just under \$1.5 billion dollars of support for its mission.⁴⁹ With CORDS falling under the purview of the military, it had the money, manpower, structure and ability to travel throughout South Vietnam, which allowed it to provide mass amounts of aid and reconstruction in more isolated regions.⁵⁰ Looking at the situation in Afghanistan and Iraq, the PRTs should attempt to replicate CORDS functions. Although the wars cannot perfectly be compared, the long and painful lessons of Vietnam may provide additional guidance for counterinsurgency strategies in Iraq and Afghanistan.

In the current state of war, the US military's mission and command take immediate precedence. If the US can provide security, attack insurgent infrastructure and win over the non-insurgent citizens, then the US can look towards achieving military success in Afghanistan and Iraq. With this said, the military must also understand the long term role and immediate benefits of other organizations and civilian advisors in reconstruction, stability and counterinsurgency missions and work with them to achieve those advantages. Once the war has ended, US Armed Forces should shift responsibility of development and stability operations back over to the civilian organizations, while still keeping minimal forces present for security reasons. Also, the civilian organizations that would take this responsibility must have the training, knowledge, and experience necessary to successfully complete development operations. Interagency competition and conflict will continue, but an ability to recognize what is in the best interest of the United States and the countries of interest remains crucial. Whether in wartime or peace time, American agencies must continue fervently discussing possible solutions, recognizing others' expertise, and working together.

NOTES

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**Knowledge is indivisible.
When people grow wise in
one direction, they are sure to
make it easier for themselves
to grow wise in other
directions as well.
-- Isaac Asimov**

PANDEMICS: Recommendations for International Preparedness, Response and Coordination

MATT BREW AND HAL SCHMIDT

The influenza pandemic of 1918 was one of the worst global health crises in recorded history. The influenza pandemic of 1918-1919, known as the "Spanish Flu", killed more people than World War I--estimates range somewhere between 20 and 40 million.¹ In the two years that this scourge ravaged the earth, a fifth of the world's population was infected, and more people died of influenza in a single year than in four-years of the Black Death Bubonic Plague from 1347

in terms of the toll in lives, but also the havoc pandemics and epidemics can wreak on weak governments. Age-old diseases such as cholera, tuberculosis, and malaria, coupled with emerging diseases like HIV/AIDS, SARS, H5N1 (Avian Flu), and H1N1 (Swine Flu) demonstrate that the international community cannot continue to isolate the disease challenges of one nation from other nations, conceptually or practically.⁷ Increased trade and commerce and the ability of international travelers

concerning pandemic preparedness, response, and cooperation through the World Health Organization (WHO). This paper provides an overview of the current structure of international organizations and policies related to disease prevention and control, presents a summary of pandemics that currently threaten the global community, examines several case studies reflecting the deficiencies in the current pandemic preparedness and response policies on an international level, and presents recommendations for improving the readiness of the international community for preventing and dealing with pandemics.

The 1918 influenza pandemic represents the threat that pandemics pose to the international community, not only in terms of the toll in lives, but also the havoc pandemics and epidemics can wreak on weak governments.

to 1351.² It is estimated that 28% of all Americans were infected.³ The influenza virus had an intense virulence, with a mortality rate of 2.5% compared to the previous influenza epidemics, which were less than 0.1%.⁴ Furthermore, the death rate for 15 to 34-year-olds of influenza and pneumonia were 20 times higher in 1918 than in previous years, which was extremely unusual since influenza typically targets the elderly and young children.⁵ Its effect continues to be felt, as the United States bases its assumptions for severe pandemic response on the 1918 influenza.⁶

The 1918 influenza pandemic represents the threat that pandemics pose to the international community, not only

to go from New York to Beijing in less than a day evidence the ever-increasing urgency and inter-dependence of global health conditions,⁸ especially the threat of pandemic disease spread. Given the current estimate global population of 6.9 billion⁹, if a pandemic of the same virulence as the 1918 influenza were to spread across the globe today, 2.3 billion would be infected and 76 million would be killed. The global community cannot afford such a healthcare crisis, as even the most basic healthcare services are insufficient in many states today.

This article asserts that the United States must take an active role in mobilizing support for the establishment of a direct international convention

World Health Organization

First an understanding of the function and structure of the WHO is necessary. According to the WHO Constitution, "The objective of the World Health Organization...shall be the attainment by all peoples of the highest possible level of health."¹⁰ The International Health Conference adopted the WHO Constitution in New York from 19 June to 22 July 1946, which representatives of 61 States then signed on 22 July 1946, clearing the way for the con-

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stitution to enter into force on 7 April 1948.¹¹ Eighty two articles comprise the WHO Constitution, outlining the functions, membership, organs, budget, voting, legal capacity, and interpretation of the WHO.¹²

Of particular importance to preparedness and response to pandemics, the constitution outlines the following WHO functions: “to establish and maintain such administrative and technical services as may be required, including epidemiological and statistical services; to stimulate and advance work to eradicate epidemic, endemic and other diseases; to develop, establish and promote international standards with respect to food, biological, pharmaceutical and similar products...”¹³ Additionally, Article 20 provides that each member state undertakes that it will take action to comply with any convention or agreement adopted by the WHA within eighteen months after the WHA agrees to adopt said convention or agreement. Following any action taken, each member state will notify the Director-General of the action taken, and if the member state is unable to the convention or agreement within the time limit, it will provide a statement explaining the the reasons for non-acceptance. In case of acceptance, each member will make an annual report to the Director-General of its status in implementing the convention or agreement.¹⁴

The WHO constitution establishes three bodies that carry out the functions of the WHO: the World Health Assembly (WHA), the Executive Board, and the Secretariat. The WHA is composed of delegates representing the member states, and it meets annually.¹⁵ It is tasked with determining the policies of the organization, appointing the Director-General, reviewing and approving reports and activities of the Board and of the Director-General and instructing the Board about matters upon which action, study, investigation or report may be

considered desirable.¹⁶ Additionally, the WHA oversees the financial policies of the organization, reviews and approves the budget, instructs the Board and the Director-General to inform the member states and international organizations, governmental or non-governmental, about any matter regarding health which the WHA considers appropriate.¹⁷

75 percent of epidemics during the last three decades have occurred in countries where war, conflict, and prolonged political violence have crippled their capacity to respond.

The second body of the WHO is the Executive Board, which acts as the executive organ of the WHO and meets at least twice a year.¹⁸ Its functions include advising the WHA on questions referred to it by the WHA and on issues assigned to the WHO by conventions, agreements and regulations, submitting to the WHA for consideration and approval a general program of work covering a specific period, and taking emergency measures within the functions and financial resources of the WHO to address events requiring immediate action.¹⁹ Specifically, “it may authorize the Director-General to take the necessary steps to combat epidemics, to participate in the organization of health relief to victims of a calamity and to undertake studies and research the urgency of which has been drawn to the attention of the Board by any Member or by the Director-General.”²⁰

The third body of the WHO is the Secretariat, which is composed of the Director-General and any administrative and technical staff deemed necessary to the WHO’s operation.²¹ The Director-General is responsible for managing and reporting to the Executive Board on the budget and expenses of the WHO.²² Additionally, and of interest in relation to pandemic pre-

paredness, the Director-General (or his representative) may establish procedures by agreement of the member states that permit him direct access to their various health administrations and national health organizations, governmental or non-governmental.²³ It is important to note that this access may only occur with express permission of the member

states. Moreover, he may establish direct relations with international organizations whose activities and efforts come within the areas of responsibility of the WHO.²⁴

According to Professor Allyn Taylor of the Georgetown University Law Center, “The foundation of the WHO’s unique responsibility to implement the right to health is the organization’s affiliation with the United Nations system as a specialized agency.”²⁵ The United Nations charter provides the basis for the relationship between the UN and WHO—specifically those sections that establish UN as the “directing and coordinateing authority on international health work.”²⁶ The WHO assumes the chief responsibility to execute the aims of the UN Charter with respect to health and disease mitigation.²⁷ With specific focus on the preventing and limiting the spread of diseases, the WHO promulgated the International Health Regulations (IHR).

International Health Regulation

According to the WHO, the “International Health Regulations (IHR) are an international legal instrument that is binding on 194 countries across the globe, including all the Member States of

WHO. Their aim is to help the international community prevent and respond to acute public health risks that have the potential to cross borders and threaten people worldwide,”²⁸ while limiting interference with global travel and global commerce. The WHA adopted the original IHR in 1969, having been preceded by the International Sanitary Regulations of 1951, which Fourth World Health Assembly adopted.²⁹ The 1969 Regulations, which initially covered six “quarantinable diseases” were amended in 1973 and 1981, primarily to reduce the number of covered diseases from six to three (yellow fever, plague and cholera) and to mark the global eradication of smallpox.”³⁰ The 2005 revisions to the IHR, which entered into

instrument provides state parties with the parameters used to decide whether or not a specific event needs to be notified to WHO under the 2005 update to the IHR. When a state party identifies a notifiable event, it must report it to WHO within 24 hours of assessing the public health information related to the event.³⁵ Notification must “include details of any health measure employed in response to the event as well as accurate and sufficiently detailed public health information available, including case definitions, laboratory results and number of cases and deaths.”³⁶

As mentioned above, the 2005 IHR establishes a decision instrument for states to use in assessing whether or not public health events qualify as

malaria, and tuberculosis, the ongoing HIV/AIDS pandemics³⁹, and the more recent outbreaks of SARS, H5N1, and H1N1.

SARS

China’s failure to disclose information concerning the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) epidemic in early 2003 prompted World Health Assembly resolutions to update International Health Regulations which would in turn broad outbreak control measures and expand information-sharing.⁴⁰ Due to surveillance and investigation limitations of the previous regulations within sovereign nations, the viral respiratory illness spread from Guangdong, China to over 40 countries around the world within weeks, resulting in 8,098 infections and 774 deaths before the outbreak was finally contained.⁴¹ While press reports claim that new WHA resolutions give WHO greater “power” and “authority” to combat international threats posed by infectious diseases, this case study will determine if the revisions will indeed do more to mitigate and prevent modern-day diseases in the interconnected world.⁴²

Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome is a respiratory illness caused by the SARS-associated coronavirus (SARS-CoV). It typically begins with a fever of 104.1° F or more and may include other symptoms such as headache, discomfort, and body aches. Some people have mild respiratory symptoms at the start and after 2-7 days may develop a dry cough that leads to pneumonia. Severe diarrhea occurs when SARS attacks the digestive system in about 10-20% of patients. The infection spreads primarily through close person-to-person contact; the virus that causes SARS, in particular, is transmitted most readily through indirect contact by infected droplets that are inhaled or land on a surface or object when a person coughs or sneezes. When another person touches the

Their aim is to help the international community prevent and respond to acute public health risks that have the potential to cross borders and threaten people worldwide

force on 15 June 2007, “require countries to report certain disease outbreaks and public health events to WHO.”³¹ The impetus to update them in 2005 was the 2003 SARS epidemic that began in China. As the WHO Director-General at the time stated, “SARS has shown us the size of the challenges we face. These new measures will help us respond even more effectively to the next public health threat.”³²

The updated IHR have in theory significantly improved the international community’s abilities and resources to respond to the spread of disease. In particular, the IHR 2005 created decision instrument criteria that facilitate more rapid assessment and notification of health/disease events.³³ Under the IHR, state parties are required to assess at the national level all reports of urgent events inside their territories within 48 hours by applying the decision instrument specified by the IHR.³⁴ This

“notifiable.” According the IHR, the four decision criteria are: “(1) the seriousness of the event’s public health impact; (2) the unusual or unexpected nature of the event; (3) the risk of international disease spread; and (4) or the risk that travel or trade restrictions will be imposed by other countries.”³⁷ Events that meet one or more of the criteria must be assessed by the state party, and those that meet two or more of the criteria must be notified to the WHO.³⁸ The IHR is a key factor in current international policy on preventing and responding to pandemic diseases, as well as on cooperation to mitigate their effects.

New Threats

The primary factors making pandemic preparedness a crucial issue for international security are the resurgence of some of the human race’s oldest nemeses in the forms of cholera,

contaminated surface and then touches their mouth, nose, or eyes, the virus is passed on. Those at risk of becoming infected with SARS include people age 40 or older, especially those over 65, and people with other medical conditions or returning illnesses that weaken the immune system. Health care workers and family members of someone who is infected with SARS are also at risk. As one might expect, health care workers were most affected from the SARS epidemic in 2003.⁴³

The first case of SARS was reported in the southern province of Guangdong, China in November 2002. The patient was a farmer who, despite being attended to at a local hospital, died soon after without a known cause of death. Suddenly, five people were reported dead in an outbreak of a flu type virus. While the Chinese government took initial action to prevent the spread of the infection, it did not notify the WHO of the “Atypical Pneumonia” outbreak until February 2003 when it became clear that it could not contain the epidemic. Even then, the information was vague. This unwillingness to cooperate with the international community ultimately meant delays in efforts to control the worldwide outbreak.

In February, cases began appearing in Vietnam when an American businessman traveling from China was treated for pneumonia type symptoms in Hanoi and the medical staff assisting him developed the disease. Doctor Carlo Urbani at the hospital identified the unusual outbreak and informed the WHO and Vietnamese government. He too would later die from the disease

after being exposed to it. The severity of the SARS symptoms and rapid infection of health care workers worried international health authorities of a new pneumonia epidemic. Thus, in March 2003, the WHO issued its first global alert about SARS. When a doctor treating the first affected people in Hong Kong stayed at a hotel in the Kowloon



US AIRMAN PROVIDING VACCINE TO COLOMBIAN WOMAN AND CHILD

Peninsula, he infected 16 of the hotel visitors. The WHO later issued its first SARS-related travel advisory when cases were reported in Singapore, Canada, Hong Kong, and the United States as a result of those visitors traveling. The WHO coordinated international effort to identify and treat SARS. Experts from the Organization were even provided to assist the Chinese Ministry of Health in epidemiological and laboratory support upon request.

At the end of March, the Hong Kong Department of Health issued isolation orders for the Amoy Garden

housing estate where 213 people had already been admitted to the hospital for SARS to prevent spread beyond the 15,000 residents of the estate. In April, China began quarantining citizens with SARS to camps and resorts to further isolate the infection. Also in April, criticism in China and abroad emerged concerning the undercounting of SARS cases in hospitals. When cases would be identified as “probable” in Taiwan, cases in Shanghai would be identified as “suspected” and death cases due to SARS were reported as being due to other complications.⁴⁴ Finally, under mounting pressure, Chinese officials allowed international officials to investigate the situation. It revealed an old healthcare system with bureaucracy and a lack of communication in an attempt to convince its citizens and the world that everything had been going smoothly. China finally decided to cooperate with the WHO and updated their total cases to 1190 with 46 deaths. On June 26, 2003, the WHO stated that “the global public health emergency caused by the sudden appearance and rapid spread of SARS is coming to an end.”⁴⁵ Regrettably, the end came with a total of 774 deaths.

In order to prevent sovereign nations from similarly hiding or masking the effects of an epidemic, the WHA adopted two resolutions on SARS and international law on infectious disease control at its 56th Annual Meeting.⁴⁶ The SARS resolution advises WHO member states to take eleven courses of action to “enhance, support, and strengthen national, regional, and international efforts to address the SARS outbreak.”⁴⁷ The resolution does not create new obligations, but simply recommends that WHO member states report SARS cases quickly and transparently. The resolution also requests the WHO Director-General take eleven steps to

respond to SARS. Each request, like the request to “strengthen the functions of WHO’s Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network,” falls into existing areas of WHO policy for disease control, meaning WHO powers have not really increased.⁴⁸

According to David Fidler, the IHR resolution also does not change existing international law by giving WHO more power and authority. The WHO Constitution states that WHA resolutions are not legally binding. For instance, the WHA can adopt treaties or IHR, but they only become binding international law when a WHO member state has agreed to be bound. The provision of the resolution to consider information attained from non-governmental sources and to check it using disease study principles had already been approved by the WHA.⁴⁹ The WHO’s Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network had been using that technique since it was created in 1998. Unfortunately it seemed unacknowledged during its existence that while the network provided opportunities for greater surveillance, it also posed challenges to make sure government responses to outbreaks were appropriate. Likewise, the provision that recommends the Director-General collaborate with national authorities in evaluating a disease threat and amount of control measures as well as performing on-the-spot studies is approved by WHO policies. The resolution does not give the WHO power to send personnel into a country to investigate an outbreak without that country’s permission. As one WHO spokesman said, “any country has an ultimate veto over allowing a visitor entry; there’s no way around that.”⁵⁰ The right to sovereignty, then, still poses a significant challenge to effective mitigation of disease spread.

The request that the Director-General alert the international community of a serious public health threat arguably grants the WHO new political power.

While WHO issued SARS related alerts throughout the outbreak, its authority to do so is not specifically stated in previous IHR or in the WHO Constitution. This does not seem to result, however, in drastic change of international law. The global alerts issued during the epidemic were met, so acceptance of this WHO capability was present before the resolution. Furthermore, WHO places the decision of how it will use its ability to issue alerts in the hands of WHO member states. According to the WHO Constitution, alerts may be issued “on the basis of criteria and procedures jointly developed with Member States.”⁵¹

Although the resolutions do not create international law that binds its member states, they do serve as examples of “soft law,” or non-binding norms, principles, and practices that influence state behavior.⁵² They encourage member states to cooperate with other countries and with WHO in disease surveillance and outbreak response. The WHO cannot enforce this duty but it is still politically powerful. One reason is because the SARS outbreak has proven that international cooperation is in a country’s self-interest. China suffered in public health as well as politically and economically because of its initial decision to not cooperate, and now serves as an example of what happens when a nation attempts to hide an outbreak or does not accept assistance. Another reason is that the WHO gained credibility in its response to the SARS outbreak among its member states. Coupled with new resolutions, the organization is leveraging its position to strengthen international infectious disease control.

HIV/AIDS

Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS), a pandemic whose spread and adverse effects (often sickness and death) occur prevalently in, but are not limited to, fragile states and ungoverned spaces, has revealed how

infectious disease can weaken and destabilize state governments.⁵³ According to UNAIDS, there are 33.3 million people globally living with HIV, the AIDS causing virus, of whom 22.5 million are living in sub-Saharan Africa.⁵⁴ As Dr. Peter Piot, former UNAIDS Executive Director, warns, “How can governments function, public services operate, agriculture and industry thrive, and law enforcement and militaries maintain security, when they are being stripped of able-bodied and skilled women and men.”⁵⁵ Exacerbating the issue is that countries with poor governance tend to resist IHR with the intention to protect state and global populations because they appear to threaten their national sovereignty.⁵⁶ AIDS, like the SARS and H5N1 viruses, emphasizes the importance of rising above the concept of sovereignty if global pandemics are to be effectively prevented or contained.

AIDS is the potentially life-threatening final stage of the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) infection. The virus weakens the immune system by attacking helper T cells, which serve as the “main switch” for the immune response. By the time an HIV patient is diagnosed with AIDS, which can take 10 or more years from the time of the HIV infection, the body has fought hard to defeat the virus, but is beginning to lose the battle. The immune system is crippled, giving disease-causing organisms that are common in the environment the opportunity to cause infection. When the helper T cells should be activated to fight the invader, the cell is activated instead by the viral RNA to become a virus factory for itself. The major modes of HIV transmission include unprotected sexual activity, intravenous drug use, and infected mother to the child before or during birth through the placenta.⁵⁷ Given these modes of transmission, it does not come as a surprise as to why fragile and ungoverned states are most affected by HIV and AIDS. These

REGIONAL HIV AND AIDS STATISTICS - 2009

	Adults & Children living with HIV	Adults & Children newly infected with HIV	Prevalance among adult population	Adult & child Deaths due to Aids
<i>Sub- Saharan Africa</i>	22.5 million	1.8 Million	5.0%	1.3 Million
<i>Middle East and North Africa</i>	460,000	75,000	.02%	24,000
<i>South and South-East Asia</i>	4.1 Million	270,000	.03%	260,000
<i>East Asia</i>	770,000	82,000	0.1%	36,000
<i>Central and South America</i>	1.4 Million	92,000	0.5%	58,000
<i>Caribbean</i>	240,000	17,000	1.0%	12,000
<i>Eastern Europe and Central Asia</i>	1.4 Million	130,000	.08%	76,000
<i>Western and Central Europe</i>	820,000	31,000	.02%	8500
<i>North America</i>	1.5 Million	70,000	.05%	26,000
<i>Oceania</i>	57,000	4500	.03%	1400
<i>Total</i>	33.3 Million	2.6 Million	.08%	1.8 Million

states often lack the health education, training, and infrastructure needed for HIV and AID prevention and treatments.

The table above shows the regional HIV and AIDS statistics. While clearly a global issue, concern is easily diverted to underdeveloped and developing parts of the world.

One of the leading organizations in combating HIV/AIDS is UNAIDS, a joint United Nations program that “leads and inspires the world in achieving universal access to HIV prevention, treatment, care and support.”⁵⁸ As a UNAIDS Cosponsor, WHO is responsible for leading the response to HIV/AIDS. WHO supports the development of national HIV/AIDS treatment and care programs while increasing HIV prevention and strengthening health systems.⁵⁹ Many other organizations such as the NGO World Vision also aid

in the fight against AIDS. The efforts of these organizations seem to be producing positive outcomes. From 2001 to 2009, the rate of new HIV infections in 33 countries (22 of which were from sub-Saharan Africa) decreased by at least 25%. In 2009, services to prevent mother-to-child transmission of HIV exceeded 50% worldwide. Before the end of 2010, greater than 6 million people were placed on antiretroviral treatment, or drugs that slow the replication of HIV, in low and middle income countries.⁶⁰

Despite these achievements, there are still many areas in which to improve. For every person who starts antiretroviral treatment, two people become newly infected with HIV. Furthermore, 7,000 people a day become newly infected with HIV.⁶¹ According to UNAIDS, “weak national infrastructures, financing shortfalls and discrimi-

nation against vulnerable populations are among the factors that continue to impede access to HIV prevention, treatment, care and support services.”⁶² Yet another issue is government ambivalence toward agencies providing assistance with HIV/AIDS programs and their own National AIDS Control Program.⁶³ Sovereign nations need to embrace the epidemic as a real problem that deserves their attention and, in many cases, external help.

H5N1

Another recent example of the challenges to current pandemic response policies was Indonesia’s refusal to share H5N1 (Avian Flu) samples with WHO in late 2006. Indonesia chose not to share influenza H5N1 samples with WHO for “risk assessment (e.g., surveillance) or risk management (e.g., vaccine development) purposes.”⁶⁴

Indonesia's decision was primarily concerned with the iniquities in the global vaccine system: developing countries cannot afford vaccines developed from samples that pharmaceutical companies freely obtain from the WHO-operated Global Influenza Surveillance Network (GISN).⁶⁵ Indonesia's concerns were reinforced by WHO's acknowledgment that patents had been sought on modified versions of H5N1 samples shared through the GISN without the consent of the countries that supplied the samples. H5N1's spread and the threat of pandemic influenza heightened this perceived inequality, as experts posited that developing countries would have minimal access to vaccine for pandemic influenza without substantial changes in global vaccine production and supply.⁶⁶

The standoff showcases the difficulties posed by the current non-binding soft law policies related to cooperation on disease spread and fundamental problems extant in the global vaccine system. Essentially, Indonesia claimed that the samples are its sovereign property and do not constitute resources that other countries or the international organizations can access and use without Indonesia's consent.⁶⁷ This claim directly contradicted the ethos and practice of sample sharing under which GISN had operated, which are based on accessing and analyzing influenza virus samples to inform development of interventions.⁶⁸ Legally, Indonesia's arguments were plausible, as WHO did not organize GISN under treaty law, so no states had treaty obligations to share samples. In addition, international law on infectious diseases applicable to Indonesia when this controversy began contained no obligations to share samples with WHO, as the 2005 revision to the IHR had not yet taken effect.⁶⁹

In addition to exploiting basic sovereignty principles of international law, Indonesia exploited international

law under the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), which was developed to address biological diversity.⁷⁰ The CBD recognizes that countries have sovereign control of biological resources found within their territories.⁷¹ It is unlikely that Indonesia would have been able to successfully withhold samples once the revised IHR took effect in May 2007. However, a continued weakness of the IHR (and the current international approach to pandemic preparedness) is that it does not mandate that countries share infectious disease samples, only that states alert the WHO if public health incidents meet the decision criteria.⁷²

RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the significant threats the international community faces from diseases old and new, action must be taken to better secure the global community from the possible catastrophe of a world-wide pandemic. Two areas of focus are prominent: prevention and response. Before examining the areas from improvement, it is useful to investigate whether or not international organizations have been successful in the past in attempting to convince states to adopt international law to address multi-laterally threats to international security.

Precedent for the creation of international laws by international organizations that motivate governments to adopt appropriate legal standards to address international issues can be found in the experiences of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the International Maritime Organization (IMO).⁷³ In some cases, UNEP has served as an effective lawmaking platform for nations in areas related to the human and environmental health.⁷⁴ By doing so, UNEP has significantly advanced the development of international law that is focused on local conditions and concerns.⁷⁵ UNEP

has identified a variety of innovative mechanisms for securing international agreement on environmental matters. By structuring its conventions with broadly framed international agreements combined with requirements for implementation through domestically based legislation, the organization has attracted the widest possible consensus.⁷⁶

The Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer to the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer provides a prime example.⁷⁷ To slow the depletion of the ozone layer, UENP cultivated broad consensus among nations.⁷⁸ Under the Montreal protocol, ratifying nations are required to gradually reduce their consumption and production of particular ozone-depleting chemicals. It also states that member nations should establish domestic legislation and policies that conform to the convention.⁷⁹ Many governments established national legislation in conformity with the treaty, including the United States, Mexico, and twelve European nations.⁸⁰

The International Maritime Organization ("IMO") has also employed agreements that appeal to a broad base of nations, coupled with nationally crafted implementation measures, to secure adoption of international agreement on marine environmental matters.⁸¹ As a consequence of the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill, IMO convinced nations to take action on the grave threat posed by oil pollution, and encouraged adoption of the International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation (OPRC).⁸² According to the convention, "Parties to the OPRC convention are required to establish measures for dealing with pollution incidents, either nationally or in co-operation with other countries."⁸³ In addition to wide-ranging measures for emergency international response, the treaty mandates that each nation institute its own national system for preparedness and

response, including a national contingency plan.⁸⁴ As of March 2011, 105 states, including the United States, have signed the OPRC.⁸⁵

The success of UNEP and IMO illustrate that international organizations can have significant influence on developing international hard law. The OPRC serves as an excellent model for a global convention on pandemics, perhaps even titled “The International Convention on Pandemic Preparedness, Response and Cooperation” (ICPPRC). The convention would specify mandate that state parties take certain precautions against pandemic spread, establish mandatory reporting procedures, and make it incumbent upon developed state parties to aid lesser developed parties in dealing with pandemic outbreaks. The United States should sponsor and promote the adoption of such a convention through the mechanisms of the WHO and IHR, while emphasizing the multi-lateral nature of the convention.

The ICPPRC would reinforce the efforts of WHO’s already established Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network (GOARN). The stated primary aims of GOARN are to:

Assist countries with disease control efforts by ensuring rapid and appropriate technical support to affected populations, investigate and characterize events and assess risks of rapidly emerging epidemic disease threats, and support national outbreak preparedness by ensuring that responses contribute to sustained containment of epidemic threats.⁸⁶

The ICPPRC would give GOARN more financial and technical resources to accomplish its objectives of better securing the global community against the threat of pandemics and mitigating their effects, as well as provide GOARN with better access to nation’s populations for study and research.

The first requirement of the convention would be to set aside an interna-

tional pandemic emergency fund for use in case of a pandemic outbreak in a country that ratifies the convention. This fund would be used to provide vaccine research and production for the disease in question and medical care for infected persons. Release authority for funds would fall to GOARN, perhaps supplemented by a voting process for all ratifying nations. This fund would ensure GOARN and the WHO have resources ready to immediately put measures in place to minimize the effect of a pandemic outbreak.

Next, the convention would specify that WHO employees and GOARN members are allowed access to ratifying states’ populations for research and sample collection without needing permission from the state in question to enter the state’s territory. This requirement is intended to prevent future incidents similar to Indonesia’s refusal to share H5N1 samples with the WHO

language establishes measures for punishing ratifying states that do not comply with the convention. These measures might include denying states access to the international pandemic emergency fund, as well as denying access to scientific data related to pandemic prevention produced by WHO and GOARN.

The ICPPRC would constitute an enormous step in improving international preparedness and response capability for a pandemic, but the U.S. and global community must also address the global health system in order to effectively support the adoption and implementation of the ICPPRC. To begin to address the global health system, the global community—led by the U.S.—needs to accomplish two critical tasks. First, the U.S. must spearhead a program to ensure vaccines are more accessible to Third World countries and developing countries that are most vulnerable to pandemic disease spread and

With the current budget-cutting atmosphere in Washington D.C., it will be all too easy for pandemic preparedness to fall by the wayside.

in 2006, which increase the likelihood of pandemic spread and decrease the international community’s ability to provide aid to affected states. (Indonesia’s issues with the global vaccine supply system are addressed later in this paper). However, WHO and GOARN would only be able to take samples with the assistance of domestic health care officials, to ensure proper treatment of infected persons and to notify the state of the occurrence.

Finally, the convention would strengthen WHO’s enforcement capabilities if ratifying countries choose not to comply with the convention. Reliance on the tradition adherence international laws like the OPRC and Montreal Protocol would be the primary basis for enforcing the ICPPRC. However, the convention should also include that

the ensuing social instability that can result from pandemic disease spread. A salient example of the international community’s failure to support developing countries with affordable and reliable vaccines is the H5N1 outbreak mentioned previously. Indonesia’s argued that the WHO’s handling of the development of H5N1 vaccines incident exposed inequities in the global influenza surveillance system.⁸⁷ Developing countries provided information and virus samples to the WHO-operated system, pharmaceutical companies in industrialized countries then obtained free access to such samples, exploited them, and patented the resulting products, which the developing countries could not afford.⁸⁸ A pandemic of global scale would place unprecedented demands on both international and

national health officials and vaccine companies.⁸⁹ “The planning effort will be more than a matter for experts in the fields of influenza virology, surveillance, and epidemiology; it must also involve experts in international politics, economics, and law.”⁹⁰ As recommended by Dr. David Fedson, a global influenza vaccine fund “might be needed to facilitate multinational vaccine purchases and distribution, especially for countries with limited resources.”⁹¹ This fund could be implemented as part of the aforementioned international pandemic emergency fund, or as a separate fund that is constantly in use. The U.S. should take steps to improve the global vaccine supply system, making it equitable, affordable, and efficient.

Second, the U.S. and the international community must increase WHO funding to deal with basic healthcare needs and healthcare emergencies in failed states and developing countries. A prime example of the results of neglecting this issue is the international community’s lack of financial support for improving healthcare in Somalia.⁹² According to WHO spokesperson Paul Garwood, “WHO had requested, in the 2010 Consolidated Appeals Process for Somalia, \$46 million, of which only 8 per cent have been funded so far.”⁹³ The WHO’s efforts in Somalia have resulted in millions of children receiving vaccinations and hundreds of medical staff receiving training in surgery and surveillance of disease outbreaks. However, the WHO is preparing to reduce these activities due to inadequate financial support, even as reported cholera cases continue to rise and the risk of more outbreaks is very high.⁹⁴ This is exactly the situation the United States and the international community cannot allow to occur. In the case of Somalia, the absence of a functioning government has led to piracy that has adversely affected international shipping, as 219 attacks on ships occurred in

2010.⁹⁵ Economic losses due to Somali piracy are estimated at between \$3 and \$5 billion since the pirates began their attacks in the mid 2000’s.⁹⁶ Additionally, the failed Somali state stands as a fertile training and recruitment area for extremist Islamic groups. The U.S. and the international community must ensure that WHO has sufficient funding to increase basic health care services in developing countries, especially those that teeter on the border of becoming failed states.

CONCLUSION

International coordination for the prevention and response of major infectious disease outbreaks is insufficient under current WHO and IHR capacities. In order to address national sovereignty, primarily “soft law” IHR, and failed/fragile state challenges to effective international policy, a global convention on pandemics called “The International Convention on Pandemic Preparedness, Response and Cooperation” should be established. This convention will strengthen GOARN in disease surveillance, enforce and strengthen IHR among ratifying countries, as well as ensure the U.S. takes the lead in making vaccines and funding for basic health-care services and healthcare emergencies readily available to vulnerable developing states. Cronin speaks to the importance of the latter:

Countries beset by poor governance and low levels of state capacity have failed in today’s world to contain and manage the spread of a contagion and mitigate its economic and political toll. The data here are compelling: 75 percent of epidemics during the last three decades have occurred in countries where war, conflict, and prolonged political violence have crippled their capacity to respond, leaving their neighbors and the world vulnerable. (Cronin 105-106).⁹⁷

The reactionary pattern of international law on infectious diseases can no longer be considered adequate among an international community at risk of disastrous pandemics from unknown, future repositories of virulent diseases. In other words, instead of creating law in response to an outbreak, states neglecting public health and failing to report disease events to authorities, and then more guidelines being recommended, states need to work multi-laterally with a strong organization defining and enforcing acceptable behavior. As Taylor notes, “Objective conditions of international life, as reflected by the rapid international spread of disease in general, and the HIV/AIDS pandemic in particular, evidence the ever-increasing urgency and inter-dependence of global health conditions.

Taking steps to improve the international community’s pandemic preparedness will not be an easy task, especially as the world continues to recover from the 2007-2009 global recession. With the current budget-cutting atmosphere in Washington D.C., it will be all too easy for pandemic preparedness to fall by the wayside of national legislation. However, the stakes are high—the world can ill afford another global outbreak of disease on the scale of the 1918 influenza pandemic. The United States must step into its role as a global leader and meet the pandemic threat head-on before it strikes while the world is unprepared.

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Using AFRICOM to Counter China's Aggressive African Policies

DREW PETRY

The African continent provides an interesting case study for the future application of American power. Gone are the days of large-scale American invasions of third world countries like Iraq or Afghanistan. Instead, American power is shifting toward more diplomatic and economic pressuring and posturing. Africa is currently the proving ground for this quasi-application, and the recent creation of U.S. Africa Command is the legitimization of this new approach. In the post-Cold War world, world powers must come up with real solutions to problems in the third world, rather than sweeping them under the rug for what may seem to be the greater good. The emerging economic importance of several African nations must be nurtured and welcomed, but also watched closely. Threats to these developing economies (and democracies, in some cases) include terrorism, humanitarian crises, and influence from a possibly mal-intentioned China. U.S. AFRICOM faces these challenges on a daily basis, and must expand its role on the continent to ensure political and economic stability in support of US policy.

Formation and Current Operations of AFRICOM

On 6 February 2007, President George W. Bush formally announced his decision to create a Unified Combatant Command for Africa called U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM).¹ US interest in Africa is largely a product

of two factors: the end of the Cold War and the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. For the most part, US involvement in Africa grew only after both of these events had occurred. In fact, in the decade between the Soviet Union's collapse and the beginning of the Global War on Terror (GWOT), there were only 20 military operations on the African continent. Department of Defense war planners publicly stated that the United States "had very little traditional strategic interest in Africa," and ranked the continent last in the Clinton Administration's 1998 inventory of "Integrated Regional Approaches" to US security.² Perhaps the American strategic assessment of Africa in the 1990's was distorted by what might be the only American military intervention well known to the public: the "Black Hawk Down" incident in Mogadishu, Somalia in 1993. Along with the 1991 Gulf War, the Battle of Mogadishu was a first conflict of the information age, and combatant commanders were given little chance to take risks, lest the American public think their sons would soon go off to fight another Vietnam. For this reason, American policymakers found it easier to ignore the African continent than to intervene in humanitarian situations, with the 1994 Rwandan genocide standing as the most obvious and terrible example of the consequences of non-intervention.

In the intervening years between the end of American military action in Africa and the 9/11 terrorist attacks,

threats to American security were allowed to fester in Eastern and Northern Africa. Osama bin Laden himself found refuge in Sudan after leaving his home country of Saudi Arabia. Bin Laden spent five years in Khartoum growing Al Qaeda into a beast capable of lashing out at the west. His organization proved its capabilities with the twin bombings of US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, and a former associate once testified in American court that bin Laden "was busy training terrorists and even trying to buy material for a nuclear bomb."³ After 9/11, the US was forced to reevaluate its assessment of Africa as a strategic non-factor and created AFRICOM.

From its inception, AFRICOM has faced an identity crisis. Its mandate is to promote American interests through military, diplomatic, and economic means. The command's mission statement reads: "AFRICOM, in concert with other U.S. government agencies and international partners, conducts sustained security engagement through military-to-military programs, military-sponsored activities, and other military operations as directed to promote a stable and secure African environment in support of U.S. foreign policy."⁴

AFRICOM reflects the security threats American leaders perceive, and

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shows the need to prevent Africa from becoming a haven for international terrorist organizations. Barkely writes that “Extreme poverty, ethno-religious divisions, corrupt and weak governance, failed states, and large tracts of ‘ungoverned space’ combine to offer what many experts believe to be fertile breeding grounds for transnational Islamist terror.”⁵ AFRICOM’s dual nature is exposed upon an examination of U.S. economic interests on the continent. As of 2006, U.S. imports of African oil reached 921 million barrels, just under 20 percent of total U.S. consumption; this figure surpassed oil imports from the Middle East, meaning Africa is the largest source for U.S. oil outside the American continents. Additionally, U.S. imports from Africa grew by 51 percent since 2000, while imports from the Middle East fell by about five percent.⁶ The third prong of AFRICOM’s mission, humanitarian aid and development, is the most complex. AFRICOM is the first American military command to heavily include other U.S. government agencies in the DoD planning process. In addition to a non-traditional military role, part of AFRICOM’s identity crisis comes as a result of its piecemeal construction. AFRICOM took chunks of U.S. European Command, U.S. Central Command, and U.S. Pacific Command and combined them into one operation covering all of Africa except Egypt. The need for reorganization was highlighted after conflicts emerged on the ‘seam’ between EUCOM and CENTCOM, especially in the Darfur region along the Sudan/Chad border. Over time, African crises required more and more of EUCOM’s resources. In 2006, General James Jones testified before Congress that EUCOM’s staff spent more than half its time on Africa issues, up from almost none in 2003.⁷

The map below⁸ shows a graphical depiction of the territory each combat-

ant command gave up to create AFRICOM.

The map opposite⁹ shows Africa with depictions of each nation’s struggle with nourishment and water supply, which provides context for some of the challenges facing AFRICOM and its governmental partners. The map does not show areas of political or armed

AFRICOM



conflict, but there is often a correlation between resource shortages and instability. The Horn of Africa is a particularly challenging region because it faces both severe water stress and high undernourishment, in addition to a lack of governance.

AFRICOM relies on a very small staff to face these challenges. Its component commands include elements from the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines, and it also hosts special operations forces. “Its staff of 2,000 includes no regular troops, no ‘trigger-pullers,’ unlike its sibling CENTCOM, which oversees Iraq and Afghanistan.”¹⁰ Another feature which distinguishes AFRICOM from typical combatant commands is the lack of permanent U.S. bases within the command’s area of responsibility. AFRICOM is headquartered in Stuttgart, Germany and

maintains no permanent bases on the African continent. The closest it comes to a permanent base is the installation at Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti, which is the leased home of the Combined Joint Task Force—Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), a force inherited from CENTCOM designed to carry out “political, military, and economic activities—particularly in Ethiopia and Kenya—aimed at combating terrorism and strengthening the capacity of regional governments and the well-being of their populations.”¹¹ Until Operation Odyssey Dawn, the designation of NATO’s intervention in Libya, which commenced in March 2011, CJTF-HOA was AFRICOM’s only lasting military involvement on the continent. CJTF-HOA has successfully prevented al Qaeda and other terrorist networks from gaining a feared foothold in the Horn of Africa, mainly through civic action programs and similar stability operations.¹² This means that U.S. power in Africa is centered on the Horn of Africa, especially Sudan, Somalia, and neighboring countries.

Chinese Involvement in Africa

China, with its burgeoning economy and seemingly insatiable thirst for raw material, is aggressively expanding into African countries with rich energy and mineral resources. In order to understand China’s current involvement in the region it is first important to understand the recent drivers of China’s engagement on the continent. In the 1960s, Beijing began to distance itself from its pro-Soviet policies and instead opted for a so-called ‘three worlds’ approach, which recognizes the importance of the developing world in international affairs.¹³ Mao identified China as a developing country in the third world and described Africa as an important player in the struggle against imperialism, but did not invest heavily in an economic partnership between the two regions. Perhaps Mao held on to

the ancient belief that China should be self-sufficient and avoid importing items which it could manufacture or mine itself.

This philosophy changed in the late 1970's when Deng Xiaoping "set China on a gradualist road of capitalist-oriented development that produced three decades of near

double-digit growth and a rise in living standards that has brought a nine-fold increase in per capita income to \$1,700 in 2005," and reduced the number of people living in poverty in China from "280 million in 1978 to 140 million in 2004."¹⁴ China's economy continues to grow: The International Energy Agency expects China's oil imports to triple by 2030. The world has likely never seen such an explosive growth rate sustained for such a long period of time.

"Chinese demand for raw materials of

all sorts is growing so fast and creating such a bonanza for farmers, miners and oilmen that phrases such as "bull market" or "cyclical expansion" do not seem to do it justice. Instead, bankers have coined a new word: supercycle."¹⁵

Increased Chinese involvement in Africa is in part designed to counter western dominance. At the 2003 China Africa Cooperation Forum held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao said China continues to invest in Africa in part because "Hegemony is raising its ugly head."¹⁶ This

position resonates well with some African leaders who dislike the strings which are often attached to American aid. One Nigerian businessman says "The US will talk to you about governance, about efficiency, about security, about the environment. The Chinese just ask: 'How do we procure this license?'"¹⁷ Additionally,

initial investment, Chinese corporations have expanded their reach into more oil-rich countries. As a result, 31 percent of China's oil requirements come from Africa, with expansion coming soon after China buys large oil fields in Nigeria's delta region.¹⁹ The China-Africa economic relationship is now

quite large. There are over 800 Chinese companies doing business in 49 African countries, and trade between China and Africa has skyrocketed from \$10 billion in 2000 to \$50 billion just six years later.²⁰ Trade between China and Africa is depicted on the following page, and demonstrates the growth since initial Chinese investments of the early 1990s. It is important to note that about half of the trade relationship comes from Chinese exports to Africa. Many of the items African countries import from China are simple manufactured goods, while a growing proportion

includes tech products such as televisions and computers. In total, about \$15 billion of the goods African countries import from China are from manufacturing or machinery and transportation sectors.²¹

Also depicted on the next page is a by-country breakdown of the amount of Chinese investment going into Africa. The red or darker shaded states show that China is not focusing on one specific region, or solely on oil producing nations. China is concerned with its long term trade relationship with the




DEGREE OF UNDERNOURISHMENT AND WATER STRESS IN AFRICA

Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe says "China provides a new alternative direction...the foundation of a new global paradigm."¹⁸ These two statements are not representative of thinking shared by all African leaders, but they do explain how easily China has been able to expand its role on the continent.

China's first major investment in African energy came in 1996 when the China National Petroleum Corporation invested in Sudan's oil fields. Today, Sudan supplies ten percent of China's oil requirements. In the years since this

CHINA'S TRADE WITH AFRICA



continent, and investing in many countries buys political capital while simultaneously undercutting the West's ability to create the hegemony Premier Jiabao spoke of at the 2003 Economic Forum.


A byproduct of China's long term trade goals is that Chinese enclaves are showing up in African cities. The pioneer generation of immigrants is establishing what is known as a bridgehead, just as Chinese miners and railroad workers did in 19th century California. Once the bridgehead is established, workers will begin to recruit family members to join the growing business opportunities in their adopted home. With up to 50,000 Chinese nationals already living in countries like Nigeria, the bridgehead is clearly established and reports "indicate that a strong prevalence for family recruiting is already underway."²⁴

There is little doubt that China's increased economic presence on

the continent benefits Africa's poor. According to analysts working for the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the "intensified aid and trade links with China have resulted in higher economic growth rates, better trade terms, increased export volumes, and higher public revenues. This is far from saying 'all is well,' but any quality of life improvement in some of these nations is to be preferred over the status quo."²⁵

China has paired increased investment with increased political influence in Africa. Some scholars believe that China is attempting to portray itself as

Some African leaders view successful Chinese involvement in Africa as a sign that Western political and economic models will not work on their continent. They are impressed by China's ability to lift 400 million of its citizens out of poverty and improve the quality of life for its remaining citizens, all in the span of 20 years. This economic development sans democracy warrants concern for the West and for AFRICOM. Western leaders must be aware of the risk of African countries choosing political stability and economic progress over human rights and democracy.²⁸



CHINESE FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN AFRICA IN 2005

an alternative political and economic model compared to the West. The best example of China's desired future role in African politics is seen by its willingness to finance the design and construction of the African Union's new headquarters building in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, at a cost of \$150 million²⁶ (depicted on the opposite page).²⁷

AFRICOM's Strategic Response to Increased Chinese Presence

AFRICOM must convince the people of Africa that political and economic progress is possible even with high standards for human rights and democracy. Winning the hearts and minds of average Africans by convincing them that America is a force for good which offers stability and security

is the best way of ensuring victory over Chinese influence as well as extremist groups such as al Qaeda. The best way to win hearts and minds is to enable Africans to improve their own lives. One action designed to win hearts and minds was a two-ship cruise of US Navy ships through West Africa which took place in 2008. During the cruise, the ships stopped in seven countries along the oil-rich Gulf of Guinea and “came ashore to mend roads, renovate schools and health clinics, bring medical supplies and provide free health care,” as well as military training to host nation security forces.²⁹ A Naval officer in charge of the cruise stated that he saw cer-

tain strengths about AFRICOM’s operation, including a change in mindset from “‘We’re going to take the beach’ to ‘we’re going to deliver supplies to the beach.’”³⁰ This sense of cooperation and willingness to shift from a war mindset to one of civil-military cooperation is critical to AFRICOM’s success in the future. This mission, dubbed the Africa Partnership Station, represents the first effort to reach out to energy-rich African nations fearful of increased U.S. military presence in the region.

More hope for success in convincing Africans to turn simultaneously towards democracy and economic growth comes from Nigerian Senate President Ken Nnamani. In a welcome address for Chinese President Hu Jintao

in April 2006, Nnamani stated that “no nation can sustain economic development in the long run without democracy.”³¹ AFRICOM leadership must take advantage of this homegrown African realization and use it to stem the Chinese influence rolling through Africa.

In order to be seen as a legitimate force, AFRICOM must tell the truth and say that its economic intentions in

navies and armies to stop thefts of crude oil, illegal fishing and immigration, drug trafficking and piracy. All these hurt local economies, undermine political stability and threaten to turn poor countries into failed states, such as Somalia, that may breed terrorism.³²

Since at least the 1990’s, the spread of democracy has been seen as a conflict management strategy. The advent of a

command dedicated to establishing stability in Africa shows that the US Government recognizes that “sustained stability depends in part on Africa’s economic development, which requires attention to the processes of conflict management and effective governance.”³³ Understanding the importance of democracy to economic success provides a roadmap for AFRICOM’s future,



DESIGN OF NEW AFRICAN UNION BUILDING

Africa are not entirely pure. America is obviously attempting to wean itself from oil imported from unstable regions such as the Middle East. Being open about this fact allows American policymakers to portray American-African partnerships as win-win situations. AFRICOM’s attempt at building goodwill in oil-rich countries on the Gulf of Guinea back in 2008 provides an example of this forthrightness:

“We wouldn’t be here if it wasn’t in [American] interests,” acknowledges Commodore Nowell. Despite the talk of soft power and the much-vaunted humanitarian aspect of the naval presence in the Gulf of Guinea, the real emphasis is still on security. It is plainly in America’s interest to help African

and is especially important in light of the so called “Arab Spring” or Awakening taking place across North Africa. There is perhaps no purer form of democracy than for the people to directly overthrow and remake a government the way they see fit. AFRICOM should observe how these countries choose to remake themselves, and must do its best to insert as much American goodwill as possible. With good fortune, countries such as South Sudan, Egypt, Tunisia, and others will turn wholeheartedly towards democracy and prove China wrong: that economic success and western-style democracy are not mutually exclusive but rather are complementary.

Conclusion

Integrating Africa into the global economy is a necessary step in the march toward stability throughout the continent. Economic “reform is one of the most critical priorities if Africa is to grow and become more fully integrated into the global economy.”³⁴ The United States must expand AFRICOM’s role in order to provide it with the ability to foster goodwill, represent American economic interests, and support emerging democracies. AFRICOM’s role should be expanded militarily to shut down al Qaeda, diplomatically to anchor military opinions, and economically to provide aid and training to African countries. One measure of AFRICOM’s success will be its ability to manage crises effectively without overreacting. As one Department of Defense official put it, the U.S. Government can consider AFRICOM a success “if it keeps American troops out of Africa for the next 50 years.”³⁵

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South Sudan’s Independence From Sudan Recognized by African Union

(online at: <http://www.au.int/>)

15 August 2011 – “This is a historic day for South Sudan and for the African Continent as well.” With these words Dr. Jean Ping, Chairperson of the African Union, warmly welcomed General Sallva Kiir Mayardit, President of the Republic of South Sudan, at the African Union headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

An enthusiastic South Sudanese Delegation celebrated its admission to the African Union. Dr Ping announced that the AU Member States had promptly accepted South Sudan as the 54th Member. Moreover, he expressed his wish to see the two Sudan’s working “towards ensuring lasting peace and stability.” Speaking of a “crucial moment” for the Republic of South Sudan, Mr Ping mentioned the pending organization of an African Solidarity Conference on Post- Conflict Reconstruction and Development for Sudan “with the view to mobilizing support for the new nation, from within and outside Africa.”

In his statement General Salva Kiir Mayardit declared that his country had already ended hostilities in the “longest civil war in Africa” and chosen “freedom, justice and equality” as key words for the future. He also promised to “do everything possible to realize a smooth and successful transition”, living in peace with the “brothers and sisters” of the Republic of Sudan, and to take the Declaration of Independence of South Sudan “as the beginning of a new struggle.”

U.S. Policy and the Libyan Dilemma

PAUL SIKKEMA

In the past few months, Egypt, Libya, and other North African and Middle Eastern states have come into the spotlight in international politics. Seemingly contagious social uprisings demanding government overhaul are springing up with the hope of bringing about the process of democratization. The African continent may be experiencing the beginning of a pivotal stage in its history, and the importance of how the United States handles this transformation cannot be underestimated. Renewed and revitalized African governments offer the United States a chance to renew and revitalize its relationship with these governments, which in some cases, is a much needed renewal.

Today, Libya offers the United States one of the most complex set of conditions to which diplomats have to respond. In order to fully appreciate the complexity and potential at stake, a short summary of the history of U.S.-Libya relations is in order, including the role of Muammar Gaddafi in this relationship. Next, the potential of the region will be discussed, and why it should be so important to the United States. Lastly, the author will address how the United States ought to treat the current situation in Libya.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Libya has rarely had the opportunity to be its own independent entity. Whether it was by the Phoenicians, Car-

thaginians, Greeks, Romans, Vandals, Byzantines, Arabs, or Italians, Libyan territory has been subjected to foreign rule for the majority of its history. Libya did not become an internationally recognized independent nation until 24 December 1951—and then only because the United Nations declared in 1949 that Libya should be independent. As an independent state, Libya has spent the majority of its history under the rule of Muammar Gaddafi, who came to power by a military coup on 1 September 1969.

Half of the Libyan population is under the age of 25. This is a powerful demographic that Gaddafi simply ignored.

Since then, Gaddafi has led Libya towards his unique vision of a socialist, Islamist utopian state. Moreover, Gaddafi's dreams extended beyond the borders of Libya. He sought first to unify the Arab states, and also proposed a unification of Africa into what could be called the United States of Africa.¹ However, despite his considerable effort and craft towards these ends, they were never achieved, and he is now fighting to hold on to his position of power as rebellion inspired by the ongoing "Arab Spring" movements in Tunisia and Egypt seek to remove the Libyan dictator.

The history of United States' relations with Gaddafi is in itself complex—understandable only within its historical context. Gaddafi came to power in the middle of the Cold War. While Gaddafi identified himself neither with the United States' or Soviet Union ideologically, choosing instead to form his unique brand of government, he came into economic partnership with the Soviet Union, even purchasing Soviet Arms to use in his war against Chad.² Thus, from the beginning, the relationship between him and the United States was uneasy.

Gaddafi's support of international terrorism only made matters worse. Gaddafi was generally opposed to the West and the role that it played in the international arena. He pursued personal political objectives against the West through acts of terrorism. The bombing of a nightclub in West Berlin—targeting American GIs in attendance, and the bombing of a French Airliner—UTA (Union des Transports Aériens) flight 772 were responses of Gaddafi to the United States' and France's attempts to take down his regime.³ Most famously, the Lockerbie bombing of U.S. carrier Pan Am Flight 103 over

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Lockerbie, Scotland on 21 December 1988 marked the high point of Gaddafi-sponsored terrorism against the West.⁴

However, in the past decade, Gaddafi has made significant steps towards mending relationships with the West. In July 2007, Libya released five Bulgarian nurses and a Palestinian doctor who had been wrongfully convicted of infecting 400 children in Benghazi with the HIV virus. This release marked the resolution of a long-standing point of contempt between Gaddafi and the European Union. More importantly, in 2003 Gaddafi decided to dismantle his WMD programs, denounce terrorism, and sign international non-proliferation treaties. Since that time, Gaddafi had been significantly more cooperative with the West, and up until the recent revolution, had even taken a prominent role in the UN Security Council, and hosted African Union, Arab League, and Arab-African summits. Gaddafi even made a first ever visit to the United States in 2009 to deliver a speech at the United Nations General Assembly.⁵ It is somewhat ironic that Gaddafi's reign over Libya could end when political ties between Libya and the United States were at their strongest.

While Gaddafi's image may have been improving in terms of international diplomatic relations, popular resentment of his regime has only grown worse in the past few years. In February 2011, a breaking point was reached. The catalyst for revolt was the recent popular revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia--and, to be sure, many of the same factors that led to uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia were also present in Libya.

REASONS FOR REVOLUTION IN LIBYA

Despite Gaddafi's efforts to build a socialist state, distribution of wealth has

remained far less than equal. Libya has gained a vast amount of wealth from its petroleum resources, even becoming the world's 12th largest exporter of oil.⁶ And, to be sure, Libya does have one of the strongest economies in Africa. However, Libya is deemed a rentier state--one which receives its primary source of income by renting out its national resources rather than producing wealth domestically. Thus, the wealth gained from oil is distributed only to the elite, leaving the majority of the Libyan population in poverty.⁷



Among this poor segment of the population are the youth and young adults. Half of the Libyan population is under the age of 25.⁸ This is a powerful demographic that Gaddafi simply ignored. However, it is precisely this demographic that is inciting protest and rebellion, demanding its share of the country's relatively vast oil wealth.

Extreme rates of unemployment have also led to a drastic increase of economic refugees. Prior to the recent revolts, unemployment rates reached above 20%. Because of the high rates of unemployment, more than 33,000 families were driven to live in slums and shacks, unable to provide themselves

with stable incomes.⁹ Another contributing factor to the potential overthrow of Gaddafi's regime is that he has, like most dictators, generally disregarded concern for human rights. Opposition of his government or his policies was simply not tolerated. Many of the laws Gaddafi implemented were repressive in nature. Law 73 of 1973 outlawed dissent from the government--explicitly denying Libyans the freedom of expression.¹⁰ Law 20 of 1991 demanded the execution of any member of society whose continued existence would lead to the dissolution of Libyan society (one can assume that this law was interpreted loosely). Furthermore, the "Code of Honor" of March 1997 allowed the Libyan government to collectively punish organizations, families, even whole towns and municipalities for the wrongdoings of an individual. Clearly, there are no checks on Gaddafi's government's legislative power, and Gaddafi has used this power to abuse the human rights of his people.

Such arbitrary legislation has given Gaddafi title to pursue and neutralize political threats. The Libyan dictator has a history of ordering the assassination of dissidents. This form of political terrorization and control has extended beyond Libyan boundaries even onto United States' soil with the assassination attempt by a Libyan agent upon Faisal Zagallai, a political dissident and doctoral student at the University of Colorado in 1980.

Gaddafi has extended his political suppression by claiming complete control of the Libyan media and press. Prior to the revolution, all news, whether in newspapers or on television, was controlled by the government. Gaddafi has understood the power that the press yields and seized that source of power to serve his ends. He televised the executions of political dissidents nationally,

virtually frightening his people into obedient submission.¹¹ However, his excessive policies, in the end, only contributed fuel to fire the revolt.

The role of technology and communication in the current revolution is not to be underestimated. Despite Gaddafi's control over news and media, protestors were able to find their voices by means of social networking sites of the 21st Century. Those in favor of toppling Gaddafi's regime and creating a new and reformed government in Libya formed their own group on Facebook. This group, as of this writing, has well above 130,000 members, and is growing.¹² Protestors have used this site to post videos, cartoons, discussions, and generally comment on the inadequacy of the current Libyan government and the need for reform. Access can be granted to this revolutionary nexus by any smart phone or computer with internet--quite a prolific source of communication for any group acting under the radar of government control. Oddly enough, Mark Zuckerberg (creator and founder of Facebook.com) may have become one of the most significant contributors to government and cultural revolution in Libya and the rest of Africa and the Middle East. Indeed, the Arab Spring may become known as the Facebook revolution.

The importance of this technology was quickly recognized by Gaddafi, who promptly prohibited the use of internet in Libya. This drastic measure was implemented to prevent both the ability of Libyan protestors to further organize their revolt and the ability of the outside world to see what exactly was going on inside of Libya. However, blocking use of the internet was not entirely successful, and videos are still emerging from the chaos within Libyan borders--including one video of the remains of government officials who were allegedly burned to death after refusing to obey Gaddafi's orders.¹³

Another notable factor that likely contributed to the recent revolt against Gaddafi's regime is his age. Gaddafi has been in control of Libya for more than 41 years, but has no obvious successor. Gaddafi has said that his son Saif al-Islam will succeed him; however, Gaddafi is careful not to show his son support for taking on his supposed upcoming presidency, leaving a feeling of doubt regarding Gaddafi's true intentions for succession.¹⁴ This could likely leave the state in a violent power struggle after his death or removal. It is worth noting that Egypt's former president, Mubarak, was similarly situated before being driven from office by Egyptian revolutionaries.¹⁵

What began as protests in February 2011 has descended into all-out civil war between Gaddafi's loyalist forces and the revolutionaries. Fighting continues to

Protestors were able to find their voices by means of social networking sites of the 21st Century.

rage across Libya as of this writing. The revolutionaries in Libya are fighting for a more liberal democratic form of government. A leader of the revolutionary forces and potential future king of Libya, Muhammad El-Senussi, has promised to pursue whatever form of government the people of Libya seek, to include a constitutional democracy.¹⁶

While NATO has decided to intervene using airpower against Gaddafi's forces and enforcing a UN established no-fly zone, intervention as of this writing remains limited, with U.S. involvement being underplayed by the media. The civil war in Libya has brought many challenges that the international community will have to address. Traditionally, the United States plays a central role

in the treatment of any global crisis, so an analysis of what concerns are at stake is first necessary before any evaluation of national policy can be formulated.

CONCERNS AND QUESTIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES

The first concern is the humanitarian aid needed for the thousands seeking safety in neighboring countries. Huddled masses have found their way to Libyan border regions, hoping to find respite from the violence of the civil war. An estimated 180,000 people are fleeing from Libya either as Libyan citizens who are now refugees, or as immigrant workers hoping to be repatriated to their countries of origin. This vast numbers of people at the borders, however, have created a logistical nightmare. How can this exodus be accommodated? International aid is already being provided--German aid ships returned Egyptian nationals from Libya, the British government chartered flights to move European refugees from Tunisia, and the World Food Program pledged \$38.7 million to assist refugees, while the European Union pledged another \$42 million for the same.¹⁷

The second problem is significantly more nuanced. To what extent should the international community, and the United States in particular, be involved in the overthrow of Gaddafi and the institution of a new form of government? The United States has already been engaged in regime changes and national restructuring both in Iraq and Afghanistan. In these instances, the United States has taken the lead role to replace former governments. Thus, the vast economic burden of rebuilding these states has fallen squarely on the shoulders of the American taxpayers. To be sure, rebuilding nations halfway around the world by use of expeditionary military forces is costly--especially

after ten plus years of engagement in Afghanistan and Iraq.

It is safe to say that the United States should not wish to undergo yet another global operation to overthrow Gaddafi's government and attempt to create in its place another liberal democracy. For one, the economic crisis that the United States is experiencing could not permit another full-fledged operation. More to the point, though, American interests in the region are not even close to what its interests were in Iraq or Afghanistan. The United States, then, must evaluate its interests in the region and formulate the best course of action to address the situation in Libya in a way that is agreeable in the international arena while simultaneously acting within the context of its interests.

U.S. purchases less than three percent of Libya's export of oil...

However, the price of oil is affected by the civil war in Libya.

REGIONAL INTERESTS

So, what are the interests of the United States in Libya? There are both economic and political interests at stake--the more pressing of which is the latter.

United States economic interests in the region are, at present, marginal. The U.S. purchases less than three percent of Libya's export of oil, so oil is not the major concern. However, the price of oil is affected by the civil war in Libya, which initially rose slightly above \$100 per barrel as violence erupted against Ghaddafi, and this burden was relayed to Americans and others at the pump.¹⁸

Before dismissing Libya as a region without significant economic interest to the United States, one should first consider the potential economic benefits

of Libya being under a more liberal and just form of government. As was mentioned earlier, Libya is a rentier state.¹⁹ Its greatest source of wealth is from its oil reserves. However, this wealth is kept only by the elite who can benefit from renting out access to these resources. This resulted in the vast amount of poverty for the masses despite Libya's wealth of resources. This is the inequality that revolutionary forces in Libya are fighting to abolish. If they are successful in overthrowing Gaddafi's regime and establishing a government that is accountable to the people, then Libya's oil wealth could trickle down to the masses, and in turn enlarging and strengthening the middle-class.

A middle-class is an essential ingredient for a boom of economic growth and development of a stable democracy. Money reaching a new middle-class would stimulate a consumption of goods, which, in turn, would lead to further economic growth, allowing for pay raises and creating job opportunities to remedy the high unemployment rate in Libya. As the middle class is able to generate more and more income, the economy grows. This is precisely what is happening in India.²⁰ If Libya can turn itself into an economic asset to the global market, nations will be scrambling to take advantage of the opportunities in Libya--the United States included.

In fact, the United States has already exhibited interest in strengthening economic ties in North Africa. The North African Partnership for Economic Opportunity (NAPEO) was established in order to fully investigate just how much economic opportunity lies in the North African region and how to take advantage of that opportunity. Through this organization, entrepreneurs from the United States and Libya have already been talking and working together to create economic opportunities and growth in both the public and private

sectors.²¹ Initiative for taking advantage of economic opportunities in Libya has already been begun, but with the possibility of restructuring the Libyan government (and, thus, economy) to one that allows for a stronger and more influential middle class, the opportunity in Libya becomes exponentially greater. This opportunity should not be overlooked by United States policy, and ought to factor into overall U.S. analysis of national interests in the region.

However, the U.S. should also consider Libya as a potential ally in the region. Libya, having close ties to both the African and Arab communities, would be an extremely beneficial ally for the U.S. Generally, the United States does not enjoy a very healthy rapport with many Arab states. Most relationships are based upon the U.S. appetite for oil. While it may be a stretch, the ongoing revolution in Libya could be viewed as a potential turning point for U.S.-Arab relations.

On 6 April 2011, the Arab League hosted an "Arab-West Dialogue Forum" in its headquarters in Cairo. This forum was held in recognition of the extraordinary events occurring in the region, including the revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya. Speakers at this forum advocated a rejuvenation of Arab relations with the West. These revolutions have given the West the opportunity to see a more humanized and relatable version of the Arab world. That is to say, the people of the Arab world also seek the traditionally Western ideals of democracy and recognition of human rights. Thus, Libya presents, not only an economic opportunity, but a political and diplomatic one as well. Speakers at the "Arab-West Dialogue Forum" hoped that the circumstances in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya could spark a new epoch in their relations with the West. U.S. policy should reflect this hope as well.²²

A PROPER RESPONSE

The best way for the United States to contribute to the stability (and hopefully the subsequent economic prosperity) of Libya is very much a “less is more” approach. Military intervention will only further the contempt of the Arab-African world for the West, viewing the U.S. as puppeteers of their leaders and acting recklessly and unapologetically in pursuit of national interests (a contempt dating back to the age of European colonialism in Africa). However, the United States does have interests in the area and would be acting prudently to pursue the realization of the potential of those interests.

First, military action by the United States should remain at a minimum. Cynicism towards United States military operations is already a problem in the Arab world. The U.S. has already assumed a backseat role in the establishment of the no-fly zone over Libya, but the sensitivity of Western military action is still evident. The Arab League and rebel forces in Libya have both pleaded for military intervention in the form of a no-fly zone, and this plea for Western assistance makes military intervention that much more politically palatable. However, Gaddafi was quick to skew this reality to fit his agenda, claiming that military involvement by Western powers would allow them to “take control of Libya and to steal their oil.”²³ The Arab League, though supporting the enforcement of a no-fly zone, criticized the implementation when it expanded to include the bombing of ground targets. While the destruction of these targets benefitted the mission of the no-fly zone, the Arab League claimed that this action was killing more civilians rather than protecting them. Clearly, military intervention is very sensitive. The best way for the United States and NATO to respond to this situation is to cooperate with the Arab League as much as possible. This will go a long way toward

changing the perception of the United States by Arab League member states.²⁴

However, though limited military action in the form of airpower is underway, what must remain under consideration is that, in order for the United States to realize the vast potential in Libya, Gaddafi must fall from power. In order to gain an ally in North Africa and a potential strong tie to the Arab League, the revolutionary forces must succeed in their overthrow of the Libyan strongman. If Gaddafi is able to somehow put down the revolutionary forces, the subsequent violence and bloodshed involved in the likely killing and persecution of anti-Gaddafi forces would be egregious, and the brutal dictator would remain in power, likely seeking to return to a past of sponsoring international

Perhaps the United States--if truly interested in the spread of democracy--should do nothing more than invest in the spread of communication technology and social media

terror and the proliferation of WMD.

Second, the bulk of the United States' financial commitment to Libya should be geared towards humanitarian support for refugees. While greater military involvement remains a risky political endeavor, humanitarian aid to refugees is a politically safe way to take action and contribute where it is most needed. The “logistical nightmare” of the exodus of the refugees from Libya is a problem that the United States can and must continue to address, for, in many cases, the lives of the refugees depend upon it.²⁵

In order to pursue the economic potential in Libya, efforts should be made to strengthen economic ties to the region--essentially expanding upon

the work already begun by NAPEO. The economic potential in Libya ought to be tapped by American and European businessmen, and U.S. policy ought to encourage whatever possible to facilitate this process. American agriculture companies have the technological capacity to transform Libya's nascent farming industry. With the help of the United States, Libya could stop having to import food (it currently imports 75% of its agricultural needs²⁶). Encouraging economic ties between American agriculture and Libya as well as investment by the American and European corporate (and perhaps governments) to build infrastructure necessary to support a rejuvenated agriculture and consumer industry will go a long way in restoring, Libya's economy and weaning it from rentier state status. Moreover, it will do much to improve relations between the United States, Libya, and the Middle East.

The most important aspect of United States policy for the revolution in Libya is to simply view it as an opportunity to strengthen relations and gain credibility with the Arab League. The best way to achieve this is to cooperate with the the Arab League in efforts to remove Gaddafi and rebuild Libya. This relationship would allow for some much-needed growth of American influence and political clout in a turbulent region.

The worst thing that the United States could do at present would be to assume a leadership role. Not only can the U.S. not afford to do so in economic terms, but exploits in Iraq and Afghanistan have been controversial in the region and economically draining in domestic terms. Democracy is spreading organically in Libya and elsewhere in the region, greatly assisted by social media and networking. Perhaps the United States--if truly interested in the spread of democracy--should do nothing more than invest in the spread of commu-

nication technology and social media to those areas where human rights are being violated and the hopes of democracy remain stillborn. The United States, NATO, or even the United Nations cannot afford to intervene in every instance of human rights violations around the globe. The greatest contribution is to empower the voice of those oppressed. Social networking and improved means of communication and organization are proven methods for popular empowerment, and thus, modern communication tools may hold the key to the spread of liberal democracy.

CONCLUSION

The turning of the tide in Libya presents an opportunity for U.S. policymakers that cannot be ignored. American relations with much of Africa and the Middle East are tense, and Libya could hold a key to revitalizing those relationships, even strengthening the NATO partnership. Developing fragile and failed states is the greatest challenge that the international community will have to face in the coming years.²⁷ Given its current momentum, Libya provides a prime opportunity for the United States, NATO, the UN and EU to pull millions of people out of poverty and give them the political voice that they deserve. There is also much room for political and economic gain in the region. The iron is hot. The question ought to be, not if, but how the U.S. and international community might facilitate the process.

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Those who deny freedom to others deserve it not for themselves.
-- Abraham Lincoln

Book Review

DYING TO WIN: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism

BY ROBERT PAPE

REVIEWED BY JOHN LOVVORN

In his book, *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism*, Robert Pape argues against the typical media stereotype of the suicide bomber as a crazed religious fanatic. By using a database of all recorded suicide terrorist attacks since their beginnings in the early 1980s, Pape claims that suicide terrorists are not the disgruntled, brain-washed Muslim youth that Americans typically think of, but actually come from the middle levels of society and can be of any religion or nationality. He also asserts that the vast majority of suicide attacks (96% as of the end of 2003)¹ are not individual attacks by fanatics but are part of a larger campaign targeting specific, political objectives. Pape's thesis is that suicide terrorism campaigns are created when 1) a group's traditional homeland is militarily occupied by a foreign power, 2) the foreign power is a democracy, and 3) the group enjoys support from the local community sustained by a religious difference between the occupier and the occupied society.² Pape believes that religion plays an important role in suicide terrorism, but that it is not a specific religion that leads to suicide terrorism, simply the difference in religion between occupied and occupier increases the effectiveness of the act as well as the ability to recruit suicide terrorists.³ A breakdown of Pape's thesis will further explain the individual aspects of his argument and

show where U.S. foreign policy can act to counter this deadly tactic.

First, the definition of occupation must be explained. The term 'occupation' as used by many terrorist groups is different from the one commonly accepted. An occupation does not have to be direct military control of a government but can simply be a military presence based in the country that the terrorists believe coerces the government to make decisions otherwise going against the will of the leadership or populace. Military and economic aid can also be viewed as occupation, especially if foreign troops are stationed nearby, if it comes with stipulations that the government must change certain policies. Any controlling of another country's government by means that involve the military is termed "occupation" by terrorist groups and is grounds for resistance and, in more extreme cases, suicide bombing campaigns.⁴

Of the 301 suicide terrorist attacks from 1980 to 2003 that occurred as part of an organized terrorist campaign, all of them were aimed at the removal of a foreign occupier from a particular group's homeland: Hezbollah wanted to remove Israel from southern Lebanon; the Tamil Tigers wanted an end to Sri Lankan control of Tamil; the Sikhs wanted to remove the Indian presence in Punjab; Hamas wants Israel to give up territory in Palestine; the Kurds want Turkey to

the vast majority of suicide attacks are not individual attacks by fanatics but are part of a larger campaign targeting specific, political objectives.

provide sovereignty to Kurdistan; the Chechens want Russia to leave Chechnya; and al-Qaeda is angered by U.S. presence in Islamic lands, specifically Saudi Arabia.⁵ All of these groups have resorted to suicide terrorism in an effort to achieve the political goal of independence for their homelands. These groups lack the military strength to challenge the occupiers conventionally, so they, as many other groups throughout history and in all parts of the world, have resorted to guerilla-style fighting and terrorist campaigns in an attempt to overcome occupiers by asymmetric means. However, these groups, unlike most resistance and terrorist groups throughout history, eventually resorted to suicide terror because they saw it as the best means to remove a democratic occupier and had the neces-

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sary religious motivation and community support to follow through.

Resistance groups tend to resort to suicide terrorism when the country occupying their homeland is a democracy because democracies have proven to be susceptible to pressure from their citizens to change policy.

Since 1980, the target country of every suicide terrorism campaign has been a democracy; Turkey, the U.S., France, India, Sri Lanka, Israel, and Russia were all defined as democratic when they became targets of suicide terror campaigns.⁶ Terrorists target democracies because they perceive them as weak, not in terms of military power--terrorists know they cannot match their occupier in conventional strength. The "weakness" of democracies comes from the low tolerance to violence expressed by citizens of a democracy, whether this results from direct attacks upon the homeland, or measured by lives of soldiers lost; the influence of citizenry upon politics and state policy can result in withdrawal from what might be labeled unfortunate adventures abroad.⁷ Terrorists believe that if they can inflict enough cost on the citizens of a democracy, the citizens will change the government or its policies, thus resulting in the withdrawal of the occupying army from the territory the terrorists claim to defend.

In order for terrorists to have a continuous flow of volunteers for suicide bombing missions, and in order to be able to promise the designation of "martyr" to those who volunteer, the terrorist group carrying out a suicide campaign must have the support of the local community. Suicide campaigns are costly to terrorists in terms of members, so they must be able to recruit from the local community to replace martyrs. Also, only the community can truly grant someone the title of "martyr" and honor their sacrifice with statues, pictures, speeches, etc., so the terrorist group must have the support

of the community in order to remove the cultural taboo against suicide and proclaim the attackers as martyrs or heroes.⁸ To do this, the terrorists must harden the boundaries between the occupiers and the occupied and solidify the "us versus them" mentality. Religious differences are most convincing to create an us versus them mentality. In the Middle East, an obvious metaphor is the religious crusade--which references an unjust past where land and resources were extracted from their rightful owners and passed to occupiers of another religious faith and culture,

Terrorists target democracies because they perceive them as weak...

The "weakness" of democracies comes from the low tolerance to violence.

thereby threatening the existence of the displaced society.

Osama bin Laden and other prominent extremist leaders used the idea of a religious crusade against Islam to incite violence against the U.S. In one of his videos in February 2003, bin Laden claimed, "One of the most important objectives of the new Crusader attack [in 2003] is to pave the way and prepare the region after its fragmentation, for the establishment of what is known as 'the Greater State of Israel,' whose borders will include extensive areas of Iraq, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, all of Palestine and large parts of the Land of the Two Holy Places [Saudi Arabia]."⁹ Such a perceived, projected loss of territory, resources, and especially culture enables Al Qaeda to scare Islamic societies into believing they will lose the right to determine their own future. Arguing against the loss of self-determination is what terrorists use to escalate the conflict to a level where society accepts acts

of suicide and mass-murder as martyrdom and just killing.¹⁰ Capitalizing on a religious difference to create the fear of losing self-determination within a community provides terrorist groups with the support they need to launch their suicidal campaigns.

Pape believes that the best way for the U.S. to be victorious over the suicide terrorists is to return to a policy of "offshore balancing" in the Middle East. He argues that if U.S. troops are completely removed from all Middle East countries as soon as possible, the feeling of occupation in the region will dramatically decrease and the rationale labeling America as the enemy becomes still-born--suicide bomber volunteers will, in turn, decrease. He also asserts that in the long run, America should reduce its reliance on foreign oil, eventually becoming totally energy independent, so that the U.S. will have little to no involvement in the Middle East.¹¹

Pape's proposed strategy, while it aims at what he identifies as the heart of the problem: occupation, is not practical and would not solve the terrorism dilemma. First, an immediate withdrawal of all U.S. troops from the Middle East could lead to disaster and chaos, especially in Iraq and Afghanistan. Leaving troops, even in small numbers after the major ongoing drawdowns are complete, until the climate is completely stable could take years, which would not be timely enough for Pape's solution. Second, if an all-out withdrawal was possible and accomplished in a timely manner, the presence of U.S. forces offshore, "balancing" the region would still be grounds to consider the region under the influence of occupation by Al Qaeda's standard of measurement. In fact, this could increase terrorist recruiting from communities that currently are friendly to the U.S. because it could then be argued that the entire region is under military occupation from offshore rather than just those states where U.S.

troops currently reside. The U.S. would progress from “occupying” a few Middle Eastern countries where troops are on the ground, to occupying the entire region with forces floating offshore. Terror groups would seek to sell the same old arguments to the local communities, as occupation and coercion of the region, claiming invasion awaited any country that did not bow to American interests. Though Pape is trying to target the root cause of suicide terrorism, his solution would only exacerbate the problem in the Middle East, because complete disengagement in the era of globalization is impractical.

Based on Pape’s thesis, there are two areas that U.S. foreign policy can address to undermine the conditions he believes are necessary for suicide terrorism. Obviously, America will not stop being a democracy, nor will it give up its interests, which are now global. The U.S. also cannot completely remove its troops from Iraq, Afghanistan, or especially the Gulf region without increasing security risks therein. For example, even if the U.S. became independent of Mideast oil, the world economy of the 21st century will continue to be driven by oil for the foreseeable future. The U.S. has a role in protecting sea lanes and Gulf oil flow, both of which will require a continued offshore and shore-based presence. However, America can minimize its troop deployments/presence as intended by the current drawdown policy in Iraq and Afghanistan, project an atmosphere of aiding local government actions and decisions rather than those conforming to American ideals and influence. This would dispel the feeling of occupation more thoroughly than American forces simply waiting offshore. Moreover, Arab governments who receive aid from the U.S. with policy stipulations are also seen as occupied by America. It is imperative that America make every effort to remove the feeling of occupation from Middle Eastern communities

by becoming more culturally aware in all its interactions with the Middle East.

The other condition for terrorism that the U.S. can work to erode is the terrorists’ community support. In the short term, the U.S. cannot change its image of being a predominantly Christian nation, nor should it do so. But it can project an image of tolerance by advertising the success and freedoms of Muslims and other non-Christian groups living in the U.S. America must clearly demonstrate and advertise that it is not on a “crusade” against Islam or Arab culture if it is to erode the community that continues to support the terrorist groups.

Local communities will not support suicide bombings and mass murder if they believe that America has the communities’ best interests in mind.¹² To foster this kind of relationship, the U.S. must ensure that all military members and political aides have at least a basic level of cultural understanding.

Pape’s thesis counters the traditional belief that crazed religious extremists are behind suicide terror and that such actions cannot be deterred. The real cause stems from foreign occupation. This assertion is certainly correct and his book is a worthwhile read in following the logic of this argument. Though his data readily supports his claim, his solution aimed primarily at offshore balancing seems impractical in the globalized world and still leaves open the strong likelihood of terrorists rationalizing the offshore presence as continued occupation. Though Pape is correct that the U.S. must work to create a counter-terror strategy that is not perceived as an attack upon Islam, nor an effort to kill more terrorists than are produced, because such policies are doomed to failure; the real key, which he seems to overlook, is to reduce the appearance of occupation and the differences between “us” and “them” while still encouraging cooperation and negotiation that accompany nation-building efforts. If the U.S.

can manage its international image and demonstrate its ideals, thereby expending more efforts to win “hearts and minds,” it will do much to curb community support for suicide terror and eliminate mainstream terrorist sympathy, all the while minimizing troop footprints and working in partnership with subject states to build successful societies. Abandonment to offshore is not the best solution.

NOTES

¹ Robert A. Pape, *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism* (New York: Random House, 2005), 15.

² Ibid, 126.

³ Ibid, 87.

⁴ Ibid, 46.

⁵ Ibid, 21, 43.

⁶ Ibid, 45.

⁷ Ibid, 44.

⁸ Ibid, 81-82.

⁹ Quoted in Ibid, 121.

¹⁰ Ibid, 92-94.

¹¹ Ibid, 237-250.

¹² Ibid, 153.

The only sure weapon against bad ideas is better ideas.
-- Alred Whitney Griswold

AFRICA DOESN'T MATTER: How the West Has Failed the Poorest Continent and What We Can Do About It

BY GILES BOLTON

REVIEW BY SARAH NICKISCH

In his book, *Africa Doesn't Matter: How the West Has Failed the Poorest Continent and What We Can Do About It*, Giles Bolton, a former European aid worker in both Kenya and Rwanda, attempts to answer the questions that surround "the West's" current foreign aid predicament: where is all that money going and why isn't it helping Africa? He also explains why Africa has not mattered to the West and why it should now.

Bolton likes to place his readers into a recurring scenario: being the leader of a fictitious African nation. Bolton gives the reader his/her own African country – Uzima – and paints a clear picture of both the qualitative and quantitative issues and demands that would come with the average conditions of such a country. For example, he purports that even with a well-intentioned, uncorrupt government, underinvestment and

to date, Africa has simply not mattered enough to result in Western efforts to precipitate real change. He suggests that Africa does not play a large enough role in the current world economy and is not of political or military significance. As such, the Western world will simply stick to its perceived humanitarian duty of providing feel-good aid to Africa without accountability, oversight, or direction.

However, with the growing interconnectedness of globalization, it is imperative that Western governments focus not only upon aid and trading agreements, but also educating voters and taxpayers who are contributing their tax dollars indirectly into the global system. As the global system continually becomes more interconnected, Africa will suddenly (and, in reality, already does) matter.

Bolton authored another book with a similar title: *Aid and Other Dirty Business: How Good Intentions Have Failed the World's Poorest Continent*. Other books with similar complaints of the West and its aid, each with varying solu-

Bolton suggests that the West needs to restructure its African aid system, not just due to a sense of moral obligation, but also as a matter of Western self-interest.

Through his recount of facts and stories that depict the reality of the African continent, Bolton gives advice to Western governments, large aid corporations, and the average individual about how to bring about change. His main point for readers to take home is his proposed set of "politically feasible" solutions to problems of managing aid, trade, and globalization in favor of poor countries. Bolton suggests that the West needs to restructure its African aid system, not just due to a sense of moral obligation, but also as a matter of Western self-interest.

poverty would still prevail and keep Africa in an ongoing trap. Bolton is not saying that corruption does not exist or that it is not a factor in this vicious cycle, but that corruption is not the primary problem and bringing about the end of corruption would not result in the solution. Like this common African misconception, Bolton walks readers through an extensive list of myths and ideas for quick solutions to show both their ineffectiveness and impossibility.

After sorting through Africa from its oddly sketched borders to infrastructure, Bolton reminds readers that

tions, are Robert Calderisi's *The Trouble with Africa: Why Foreign Aid Isn't Working*, and *Dead Aid: Why Aid Is Not Working and How There Is a Better Way for Africa* by Dambisa Moyo. While the facts are similar in content, each authors' solutions are diverse. Bolton makes a point to demonstrate that the common man and Western voter can do something to incite change in the Western world's relationship with Africa.

The major fault found with Bolton's *Africa Doesn't Matter* is easily gathered from the title: the exclusion of "the East." Bolton focuses primarily on the Americas and Europe throughout his critique of the current aid system. His statistics are solely concentrated on the Western world. The only information about Asian relations with Africa is a chart including a single data column regarding Japan. In order to look at this issue and its varying solutions with the big picture in mind, it is absolutely necessary to approach all angles, including the role of Asia in Africa, and particularly, the role of China [as mentioned elsewhere in this journal].

In sum, Bolton's perspectives are well-articulated throughout the book, and he should be commended for his clarity and intriguing anecdotes. Ranging from personal stories to fictional scenarios, he clearly depicts to his readers a picture of Africa's current state of poverty, how it affects the day-to-day decisions of its inhabitants, and how it should affect those who are on the outside looking inward, from large governing bodies to the average shopper at the check-out line. Globalization will increasingly mean that everyone, even Africans, do indeed matter.

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